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THE PROSECUTOR’S ETHICAL DUTY TO SEEK
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN POLICE HANDS:
LESSONS FROM ENGLAND
*

Stanley Z. Fisher
INTRODUCTION
Kyles v. Whitley,1 a divided Supreme Court
reversed defendant’s capital murder conviction
because prosecutors, who had responded to a
pretrial defense motion for disclosure by saying
that there was “ no exculpatory evidence of any
nature,” 2 had in fact failed to disclose numerous
pieces of exculpatory evidence to the defense.
The Court found that the undisclosed evidence
might have bolstered the defendant’s claim that he
was innocent, and that the true perpetrator was an
In its brief,
uncharged informant named Beanie.3

I

N

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am
grateful to Mike McConville, Chairman, School of Law at the
University of Warwick, England, and to his staff for
graciously hosting my research visit there in the Spring of
1999. Professor McConville and Roger Leng of that school were
both generous with their time, contacts and expertise. I am
also indebted to the Crown Prosecutors, police officials,
defense solicitors, and others in England who responded to my
requests
for
information
with
remarkable
patience
and
kindness.
Finally, I appreciate the skillful research
assistance I received from Colin Kisor, J. Peyton Worley, and
Jeffrey Rupp, guidance on source materials from colleagues
Robert
Bone
and
Susan
Koniak,
and
helpful
editorial
suggestions
from
Eric
Blumenson,
Dan
Givelber,
Kevin
McMunigal, and Harry Subin.
1. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
2. Id. at 428 (quoting prosecutor).
3. Non-disclosed items known to the police included:
initial eyewitness statements taken by police (arguably closer
to fitting Beanie); police records establishing Beanie’s
initial call to the police; his inconsistent statements to the
police, and his suggestion that the police search defendant’s
rubbish; evidence linking Beanie to other crimes committed at
the same grocery store and to an unrelated murder; and a
computer printout of the license numbers of the cars police
found in the parking lot on the night of the murder (which did
not include defendant’s car, although it was the police theory
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the State of Louisiana argued that some of the
exculpatory evidence was not disclosed even to the
prosecutor until after trial, and that the state
“ should not be held accountable . . . for evidence
known only to police investigators and not to the
Until Kyles, the Supreme Court
prosecutor.” 4
never had cause to decide this claim,5 which the
Court rejected:
[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn
of any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government’s behalf in the case,
including the police. But whether the prosecutor
succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation
(whether, that is, a failure to disclose is in
good faith or bad faith), the prosecution’s
responsibility for failing to disclose known,
favorable evidence rising to a material level of

that the killer had left his car in the lot after driving off
with the victim’s car and the jury had been shown a grainy
enlargement of a crime scene photograph that supposedly had
defendant’s car in the background). See id. at 428-30. Kyles
was retried three times after the Supreme Court reversed his
conviction, resulting in a hung jury each time.
He was
released in 1998 after 14 years in prison, coming once within
30 hours of execution. See Pamela Coyle, Tried and Tried
Again: Defense Lawyers Say the D.A. Went Too Far Prosecuting
a Louisiana Man Five Times for Murder, 84 A.B.A. J., Apr.
1998, at 38-39.
4. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438.
In oral argument, the state
renounced this argument, conceding that the state is “ held to
a disclosure standard based on what all State officers at the
time knew.” Id. at n.11.
5. Even before Kyles, courts had generally held the
prosecutor responsible under Brady for disclosing material
information known only to the police. See, e.g., Barbee v.
Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964) (“ The duty to
disclose is that of the state, which ordinarily acts through
the prosecuting attorney; but if he too is the victim of
police suppression of the material information, the state’s
failure is not on that account excused.” ); Jonathan M.
Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the
Prosecution Team, 16 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 331, 347 (1998)
(“ [F]ederal discovery obligations extend to those government
agencies that are so closely ‘aligned’ with the prosecution of
a specific matter that justice requires their records be
subject to the respective discovery obligations.” ); Robert
Hochman, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth
in Criminal Trials, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1673, 1699 (1996)
(distinguishing between prosecutors’ “ classic Brady” duty to
disclose material exculpatory evidence that they possess or of
which they know, and their “ search Brady” duty, requiring
prosecutors to make reasonable efforts to locate and disclose
such evidence that is not known personally to them).
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importance is inescapable.6

The Supreme Court again applied the Kyles
doctrine in 1999. Like Curtis Kyles, Tommy David
Strickler brought federal habeas proceedings to
attack a capital conviction and death sentence on
Brady grounds.7 The trial prosecutor gave defense
counsel “ open file” discovery, but his files did
not contain certain exculpatory materials found in
These
the
police
files
after
conviction.8
materials might have been used to impeach the
testimony of a key prosecution eyewitness, Anne
Stoltzfus.
In her trial testimony, Stoltzfus
claimed to have identified Strickler’s photograph
“ with absolute certainty.” 9 She also confidently
and in great detail described Strickler’s initial,
aggressive contacts with the victim.
However, undisclosed police notes of interviews
with Stoltzfus, and her written messages to the
police, showed that she initially could identify
neither the victim, nor Strickler, and that her
memory improved only after several additional
conversations with the police and with the
The
trial
prosecutor
victim’s
boyfriend.10
asserted, and the defense denied, that some of
these
exculpatory
documents
were
in
the
But
prosecution files examined by the defense.11
the prosecutor conceded that he had never seen
6. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
7. See Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1946-47
(1999).
8. In federal habeas proceedings, the district court issued
a sealed, ex parte order granting petitioner’s counsel the
right to examine and copy all of the police and prosecution
files in the case. The Supreme Court noted, without deciding,
that the district court might have lacked authority to grant
such sweeping discovery without a showing of good cause. See
id. at 1950; cf. State v. Landano, 637 A.2d 1270, 1279 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (indicating that a federal district
court in habeas action granted petitioner’s ex parte
application for a temporary restraining order, ordering
federal marshals to seize files maintained by several New
Jersey police departments as well as state and county
prosecution agencies revealing critical exculpatory evidence
that, despite numerous earlier requests, had never been
disclosed). Landano’s murder conviction was reversed, and he
was ultimately freed. See Susan Sachs, 2d Trial in Killing of
Officer Ends With Acquittal, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1998, at B1.
9. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting case record).
10. See id. at 1944-45 & n.9.
11. See id. at 1945.
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some of the documents until long after the trial.12
Relying on Kyles, the Supreme Court cited the
individual prosecutor’s “ duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on
the government’s behalf in [the] case, including
the police.” 13
In Kyles, the Court justified this conclusion by
appeals to precedent, administrative feasibility,
and policy:
[N]o
one
doubts
that
police
investigators
sometimes fail to inform a prosecutor of all they
know.
But neither is there any serious doubt
that
‘procedures
and
regulations
can
be
established to carry [the prosecutor’s] burden
and to insure communication of all relevant
information on each case to every lawyer who
deals with it.’ Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972). . . .
[A]ny argument for
excusing a prosecutor from disclosing what he
does not happen to know about boils down to a
plea to substitute the police for the prosecutor,
and even for the courts themselves, as the final
arbiters of the government’s obligation to ensure
fair trials.14

The
Court’s
last
point,
that
excusing
a
prosecutor’s failure to disclose information known
to the police would make them the “ final
arbiters” of the state’s disclosure obligations,
makes sense. Neither the dissenters in Kyles nor
courts generally have disputed this proposition.
The
Court’s
doctrinal
and
administrative
rationales, however, are less satisfying. They
either ignore or pay insufficient attention to the
actual
relationship
between
police
and
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1948 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
437 (1995)).
After a lengthy analysis of the evidence
produced at trial, the Court upheld Strickler’s death sentence
on grounds that the suppressed evidence was not “ material.”
Id.
at
1952-55.
Although
there
was
a
“ reasonable
possibility” that Strickler would not have been sentenced to
death if the suppressed material had been disclosed, he had
failed to meet Brady’s stricter standard of materiality:
a
“ reasonable probability” of a different result. Id. at 1953.
In a separate opinion, Justice Souter argued for changing the
Brady materiality standard from a “ reasonable probability”
to a “ significant possibility.” Id. at 1956-57 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
14. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438.
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prosecutors.
Doctrinally, the Court relied on Giglio v. United
States,15 which holds only that one prosecutor
should
be
held
accountable
for
exculpatory
evidence in the possession of another prosecutor
in the same office:
The prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such
it is the spokesman for the Government.
A
promise made by one attorney must be attributed,
for these purposes, to the Government.
To the
extent this places a burden on the large
prosecution offices, procedures and regulations
can be established to carry that burden and to
insure communication of all relevant information
on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.16

The Kyles court failed to acknowledge the
distinction between holding prosecutors strictly
responsible for the conduct of other prosecutors
(in the same office), and for the conduct of
police, who are not normally employed by or
directly accountable to the prosecutor.17 Thus,
Giglio
hardly
supports
an
extension
of
prosecutorial
responsibility
to
include
undisclosed evidence in the hands of the police.
The Kyles Court also makes a crucial but dubious
empirical claim: that a prosecutor “ has the means
to
discharge
the
government’s
Brady
responsibility” by establishing “ procedures and
regulations” to ensure a flow of “ all relevant
15. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
16. Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
As authority for
holding the prosecution responsible for a promise made by one
of its assistants, the Court cited Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 272 (1958), and American Bar Association, Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery and Procedure Before
Trial, Standard 2.1(d) (1970).
According to the ABA
Standards, a prosecutor’s obligation extends to material in
possession or control of persons who have “ participated in
the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either
regularly report or, with reference to the particular case,
have reported to the prosecutor’s office.”
Standards for
Criminal Justice, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial,
Standard 11-2.1(d) (2d ed. 1980).
17. See Stanley Z. Fisher, “ Just the Facts, Ma’am” : Lying
and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28
N. Eng. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1993) [hereinafter Fisher, Just the
Facts]; Donald M. McIntyre, Impediments to Effective Police
Prosecutor Relationships, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 201, 223-24
(1975).
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information”
from the police to his office.18
According to the Court’s reasoning, because the
prosecutor has the ability to learn of exculpatory
evidence in the hands of police, she bears the
responsibility under Brady to ensure disclosure to
the defense.
Do prosecutors actually have this
ability?
The Court offers no support for its
optimistic assertion.
On the contrary, state and
local
police
agencies
generally
operate
independently
of
prosecutors,
and
answer
to
As
a
result,
different
constituencies.19
prosecutorial access to information known to the
police is a matter of persuasion and negotiation,
rather than authority.
The relationship is
governed by informal practices about which little
is known.
If, in fact, prosecutors lack the power to ensure
police transmission of exculpatory evidence to
them, then the Court’s decision in Kyles places an
unrealistic burden on the prosecutor “ to insure
communication of all relevant information [known

18. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 (quoting Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
19. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 53. The
situation might be somewhat different in the federal
jurisdiction. For instance, in United States v. Osorio, 929
F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1991), despite a court order to disclose a
key witness’s prior criminal conduct, the prosecutor failed to
reveal extensive activity known to FBI agents involved in the
case. The prosecutor maintained that the information had been
disclosed as soon as it was received from the FBI. See id. at
760.
Denying defendant relief for lack of prejudice, the
Court nonetheless stated:
[T]he prosecutor is duty bound to demand compliance
with
disclosure
responsibilities
by
all
relevant
dimensions of the government.
Ultimately, regardless
of whether the prosecutor is able to frame and enforce
directives to the investigative agencies to respond
candidly and fully to disclosure orders, responsibility
for failure to meet disclosure obligations will be
assessed by the courts against the prosecutor and his
office.
Id. at 762; see also Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an
Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role,
68 Fordham L. Rev. 723, 736 (1999) (“ [I]nvestigative agencies
have ‘a considerable degree of independence’ from prosecutors:
‘the relationship between federal investigative agencies and
federal prosecutors is coordinate, not
hierarchical.’”
(quoting
Daniel
C.
Richman,
Federal
Criminal
Law,
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA
L. Rev. 757, 780 (1999))).
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to the police] on each case . . . .” 20 Even more
troublesome, the Court simply glosses over an
important
underlying
problem.
As
Kyles,
Strickler, and other disturbing cases21 illustrate,
the
defendant’s
right
to
be
informed
of
exculpatory evidence depends largely upon the
prosecutor’s access to information in police
But the prosecutor’s access in turn
hands.22
depends upon police cooperation in recording,
preserving, and revealing exculpatory evidence to
the prosecutor.
If that cooperation is not
forthcoming, the prosecutor’s ability to comply
with Brady is fatally compromised.
In a previous article, I argued that police
20. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 (quoting Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
For an argument that the
prosecutor’s constitutional duty extends only to favorable
evidence of which she knew or should have known, see Hochman,
supra note 5, at 1699 (1996).
In this helpful student
Comment, Hochman distinguishes between two duties of the
prosecutor under Brady:
the “ classic Brady”
duty to
disclose material exculpatory evidence that she possesses or
of which she knows, and the “ search Brady” duty, requiring
prosecutors to make reasonable efforts to locate and disclose
such evidence that is not known personally to them. See id.
According to Hochman, the “ classic Brady” duty also binds
non-prosecutor state agents who fail to disclose that material
exculpatory evidence exists. See id. at 1697-99, 1702-03.
Thus, in Kyles, the Court should have reversed because the
police, rather than the prosecutor, suppressed the exculpatory
evidence.
Although the result to the defendant is the same
under either analysis, Hochman argues that doctrinal clarity
is advanced by attributing Brady obligations directly to other
state agents in addition to the prosecutor.
Hochman is
correct that non-prosecutor state agents, including the
police, are constitutionally answerable for their own conduct
in suppressing evidence to which the defendant has a right
under Brady. See infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
21. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), A.T.F.
investigators failed to inform the Assistant U.S. Attorney who
prosecuted
the
case
that
the
suppressed
compensation
agreements existed. See id. at 671 & n.4.
Defendants in a
number of other cases have been convicted and sentenced to
death or long prison terms, only later to discover that the
police had suppressed crucial exculpatory evidence. Two more
egregious examples are Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.
1991), and Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir.
1988). For a detailed discussion of Jones, see Fisher, Just
the Facts, supra note 17, at 2-4, 36-38, 40-42.
22. But see Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in
the Guilty Plea Process, 40 Hastings L.J. 957, 1002-03 (1989)
(arguing that much Brady material will be known to the
prosecutor independently regardless of police cooperation).
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reports in this country differ “ from those
produced
under
a
truly
neutral
system
of
investigation, such as reportedly exists in France
and Germany, where the police are required to
investigate and record exculpatory as well as
While American police
inculpatory facts.” 23
departments pay lip service to the goal of
reporting “ all relevant evidence”
in criminal
investigations, in practice police reports are
“ artifacts of the adversary process,” which tend
to include evidence of guilt and omit exculpatory
Courts have been unwilling to buttress
facts.24
Brady rights by requiring the police, either
generally or in particular cases, to investigate,
record,
or
reveal
exculpatory
evidence
to
In addition, prosecutors normally
prosecutors.25
lack the power (and perhaps the motivation) to
insist upon access to exculpatory evidence known
As a result, I concluded, we
to the police.26
suffer a systematic loss and suppression of
exculpatory evidence at the stage of police
investigation and reporting.
As another writer
has stated, this “ fundamentally impairs the
functioning of the fact finding process and its
ability
to
determine
guilt
or
innocence
By way of a remedy, I proposed,
correctly.” 27
inter alia, that “ rules of procedure and ethics
should
require
prosecutors
to
familiarize
themselves with police investigative and recordkeeping procedures, to press the police to report
specified categories of potentially exculpatory
facts,28 and to make good faith efforts to ensure
23. Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 57 (citing
John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal
Procedure:
“ Myth” and Reality, 87 Yale L.J. 1549, 1554,
1562-63 & n.51 (1978)); see Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] §§
136(II), 160(II) (German Code of Criminal Procedure).
24. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 17-31, 57.
25. See id. at 40-48.
26. See id. at 51-54
27. Note, Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate
Police Investigation: A Step Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
835, 835 (1978).
28. Suggested
categories
included
“ the
identities
of
percipient witnesses, their state of sobriety, discrepancies
in witness descriptions of the perpetrator, discrepancies
between such descriptions and the defendant’s appearance, any
alibi offered by the defendant, and the identity of any alibi
witnesses.” Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 49-50.
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their access to all relevant records.” 29
In this Article I revisit, in light of recent
developments, the prosecutor’s responsibility to
disclose exculpatory evidence known to the police.
In Part I, I describe a recent English30 statute
that establishes a detailed legislative framework
regulating
prosecutorial
access
to
relevant
evidence gathered by the police.
The rigorous
demands that English law makes upon police and
prosecutors to ensure prosecution access to police
investigative files contrasts strongly with our
own laissez faire approach.
This has led me to
reexamine
my
own
previous
recommendations.
Although an English-style legislative solution
would be the most direct and effective remedy, I
doubt that the political will to pass such
legislation exists. Recognizing the likelihood of
continuing legislative (and judicial) abstention,
we must call prosecutors to greater account.
Accordingly, in Part II of this Article, I propose
amendments to the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the ABA Standards for the Prosecution
Function.
These amendments aim to reinforce the
prosecutor’s responsibilities under Brady and
Kyles v. Whitley to obtain access to relevant
information known to the police.
I. ENGLISH LAW: THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND INVESTIGATION
ACT, 1996
The
complex
evolution
of
English
criminal
disclosure law31 culminated in England’s Criminal
29. Id. at 55.
I also proposed that defense attorneys
should attempt to document police record-keeping practices,
draft discovery requests to include informal investigative
documents such as field notes, and consider suing the police
for equitable relief. See id. at 56.
30. Although I refer in this Article to “ English” law, the
law described actually applies to both England and Wales. By
“ police”
I mean also to include criminal investigators
acting for other law enforcement agencies.
31. My account of English law and practice draws upon the
literature cited below, and on field interviews conducted in
April 1999 with English prosecutors, defense lawyers, police,
academic experts, and others knowledgeable about the history
and implementation of the disclosure law.
My informants
included:
high, middle, and low-level staff of the Crown
Prosecution Service in London, Coventry, and Abingdon;
criminal defense solicitors in London and Birmingham; police
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officials in London and at the West Mercia Constabulary
Headquarters in Hindlip, Worcester; senior staff at JUSTICE
headquarters in London and at the Criminal Cases Review
Commission in Birmingham. The prosecutors and defense lawyers
I spoke with were all solicitors; regrettably, I had no
opportunity to interview any barristers.
I also had the
invaluable benefit of information and advice from expert
faculty of the University of Warwick Law School. In footnote
references I have identified most informants by their position
rather than by name.
I have relied principally on the following published
sources. For general works on English criminal procedure, see
Andrew Ashworth, The Criminal Process:
An Evaluative Study
(2d ed. 1998); Frank Belloni & Jacqueline Hodgson, Criminal
Injustice: An Evaluation of the Criminal Justice Process in
Britain (2000); Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 1999 (Peter
Murphy ed., 9th ed. 1999); Justice in Error (Clive Walker &
Keir Starmer eds., 1993); Mike McConville et al., The Case for
the Prosecution (1991); John Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in
England and Wales, in Comparative Criminal Procedure, ch. 4
(John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996); Graham Hughes, English
Criminal Justice:
Is it Better Than Ours?, 26 Ariz. L Rev.
507 (1984).
On the law of pretrial disclosure, see David Corker,
Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings (1996); Roger Leng &
Richard Taylor, Blackstone’s Guide to the Criminal Procedure
and Investigations Act 1996 (1996); John Niblett, Disclosure
in Criminal Proceedings (1997); Anthony Edwards, The Criminal
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996:
The Procedural
Aspects, 1997 Crim. L. Rev. 321; Ben Fitzpatrick, Disclosure:
Principles, Processes and Politics, in Miscarriages of
Justice:
A Review of Justice in Error 151 (Clive Walker &
Keir Starmer eds., 1999); Roger Leng, Defence Strategies for
Information Deficit:
Negotiating the CPIA, 1 Int’l. J.
Evidence & Proof 215 (1997) [hereinafter Leng, Defence
Strategies];
Patrick
O’Connor,
Prosecution
Disclosure:
Principle, Practice and Justice, in Justice in Error, supra,
at 101; British Academy of Forensic Sciences, Disclosure Under
the
Criminal
Procedure
and
Investigations
Act
1996
(unpublished papers presented at Seminar held at Gray’s Inn,
Dec. 1, 1999, chaired by Lord Mackay of Clashfern) (on file
with author); Home Office, Disclosure:
A Consultation
Document (1995) (unpublished, on file with author); JUSTICE,
Disclosure: A Consultation Paper, The JUSTICE Response (1995)
(unpublished, on file with author).
I refer in this Article to the impact of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“ PACE” ) on pretrial disclosure
of exculpatory evidence, but I do not discuss PACE in detail.
For scholarship on PACE, see generally David Brown, Detention
at the Police Station Under the Police and Criminal
Investigations Act 1984 (Home Office Research Study No. 104,
1989); David Brown, Investigating Burglary:
The Effects of
PACE (Home Office Research Study No. 123, 1991); David Brown,
Pace Ten Years on:
A Review of the Research (Home Office
Research Study No. 155, 1997) [hereinafter Brown, PACE Ten
Years On]; Stephen Moston & Geoffrey M. Stephenson, The
Questioning and Interviewing of Suspects Outside the Police
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Procedure and Investigation Act, 1996 (“ CPIA” or
“ the Act” )32 and a subsidiary Police Code of
The Act made major
Practice (“ the Code” ).33
changes in the law governing the prosecution’s
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
Although
I
will
describe
these
defense.34
developments in English disclosure law, I do so
only in order to give context to a related, but
distinct, feature of the Act that is of prime
interest in this Article: the Act’s comprehensive
regulation of prosecution access to information in
police files. The Act provides that:
1.the police must list on schedules all existing
items of relevant evidence, including exculpatory
evidence, and their location;
2.the police must give copies of the schedules to
the prosecution;35
3. the police must give the prosecutor access to
all investigatory materials in their possession;
and
4. record-keeping obligations must be assigned to
specific police officers or employees, who must
certify their compliance in writing to the
prosecutor.

In the following sections I will describe the
background to the Act, its requirements regarding
the disclosure of exculpatory evidence in serious
criminal cases, and the duties of police to
Station (Royal Comm’n on Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 22,
1993); Michael Zander, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984 (rev’d 2d ed. 1990); Clive Coleman et al., Police
Investigative Procedures: Researching the Impact of PACE, in
Justice in Error, supra, at 17; Symposium, The Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 1985 Crim. L. Rev. 535; Gordon Van
Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence:
A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 Hastings
L.J. 1 (1986).
32. Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act, 1996, ch. 25
(Eng.) [hereinafter CPIA].
33. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, s.23(1):
Code of Practice (effective Apr. 1, 1997), reprinted in
Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 1999, supra note 31, app. 6
[hereinafter CPIA Code of Practice]. In this Article I refer
to the Act and Code of Practice together as “ the Act."
34. As discussed infra, these changes were motivated by
perceived abuses of the defendant’s right, under prior law, to
broad, “ open file” discovery. See infra notes 51-60 and
accompanying text.
35. Except for “ sensitive” items, copies also are given to
the defense. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
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investigate,
record,
retain
and
reveal
such
evidence to the prosecutor.
I will then discuss
issues that have arisen regarding implementation
of the Act.
Readers who would like background
information about the English system of criminal
prosecution may refer to the brief discussion of
this subject in Appendix A to this paper.36
A. The Evolution of Pre-1996 English Disclosure
Law
The complex history of English disclosure law has
been detailed elsewhere.37 Until enactment of the
CPIA in 1996, England had no formal system of
However, the
discovery in criminal proceedings.38
accused’s right to advance notice of relevant
evidence in possession of the prosecution was
On the other
considered a fundamental right.39
hand, before 1996 the accused owed only a very
limited duty to disclose his defense to the
This was radically changed by the
prosecution.40
new Act.
English law distinguishes between evidence that
the prosecution intends to produce at trial to
prove its case, and other relevant “ unused
material” in its possession.
As to the former,
English practice for at least the past century has
required advance disclosure of the prosecution
The pre-Act law governing
case to the defense.41
disclosure
of
unused
evidence
developed
as
36. See infra Appendix A (Organization of Criminal Courts,
Prosecution
and
Police,
and
Police
Record-Keeping,
in
England).
37. See generally Niblett, supra note 31 (detailing the
history of English disclosure law); O’Connor, supra note 31,
at 101-27 (same).
38. See Niblett, supra note 31, at 3.
39. “ [I]n our adversarial system, in which the police and
prosecution control the investigatory process, an accused’s
right to fair disclosure is an inseparable part of his right
to a fair trial.” R. v. Brown [1995] 1 Crim. App. 191, 198
(opinion of Steyn, L.J.) (noting in dicta that there is no
prosecution duty to disclose information tending to discredit
defense witnesses); see also Corker, supra note 31, at 7-9,
21-39 (discussing the development of disclosure law).
40. Prior to the Act, the defense was required to disclose
only alibi defenses and intention to present expert evidence.
See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
41. See Corker, supra note 31, ch. 4; Niblett, supra note
31, at 34.
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follows.
Following
several
miscarriages
of
justice in the 1970s involving fabrication of
evidence and/or non-disclosure of exculpatory
the
Attorney
General
in
1981
evidence,42
promulgated the Guidelines for the Disclosure of
The
“ Unused
Material”
to
the
Defence.43
Guidelines declared that, in cases to be tried on
indictment, prosecutors have a duty before trial
to disclose “ unused material” to the defense.
“ Unused material” had to be disclosed “ if it
ha[d] some bearing on the offence(s) charged and
the surrounding circumstances of the case.” 44 The
disclosure obligation was subject to specifically
defined discretionary exceptions but, in case of
doubt, a presumption in favor of disclosure
applied.45
The Guidelines were the first statement of
nationally uniform disclosure principles, but were
The courts, however, came
not legally binding.46
to regard the Guidelines as reflecting minimum
Furthermore, in the
common law requirements.47
fifteen
years
between
promulgation
of
the
Guidelines and passage of the 1996 Act, the courts
expanded the prosecution’s disclosure obligations
in two major respects: first, by eliminating the
prosecution’s
unilateral
discretion,
asserted
under the Guidelines, to withhold disclosure in
particular cases; and second, by broadening the
42. See Corker, supra note 31, at 35; Niblett, supra note
31, ch. 3; O’Connor, supra note 31, at 102-06; infra notes 6163 and accompanying text.
43. See The Attorney-General’s Guidelines for the Disclosure
of “ Unused Material” to the Defence (1981), [1982] 74 Crim.
App. 302, reprinted in Niblett, supra note 31, app. 1
[hereinafter Guidelines].
The Guidelines were promulgated
immediately following issuance of the Philips Commission
report,
which
was
critical
of
prosecution
disclosure
practices. See Corker, supra note 31, at 28. For discussion
of the events leading up to issuance of the Guidelines, see
Niblett, supra note 31, ch. 6.
44. Guidelines, supra note 43, § 2.
Disclosure was to be
accomplished by providing copies of documents shorter than 50
pages, and permitting inspection of longer ones. See id. §§ 45.
45. See id. §§ 6, 9.
46. See Corker, supra note 31, at 34.
47. See Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report 91 n.20
(London:
HMSO, 1993) [hereinafter Runciman Comm’n Report]
(stating that the guidelines “ to all intents and purposes
have the force of law” ).
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scope of the “ unused material”
that must be
disclosed.
Both
developments
significantly
influenced the content of the 1996 Act.
In a
third
important
step,
the
Crown
Prosecution
Service issued record-keeping guidelines to the
police.
The
Guidelines
initially
authorized
the
prosecutor unilaterally to withhold otherwise
disclosable material from the defense in a number
of specifically defined circumstances.
The Court
of Appeal, however,
in reversing the notorious
wrongful conviction in Regina v. Ward,48 eliminated
the prosecutor’s unilateral discretion.
Applying
the civil law doctrine of “ public interest
immunity” (“ PII” ), the Court instead required
the prosecutor in each case to obtain court
approval
to
withhold
sensitive
items
of
disclosable material from the defense.49 The 1996
Act incorporated the regime of judicial control
over non-disclosure based upon PII.50
The 1989 Guinness Ruling51 broadened the scope of
“ unused material” that must be disclosed to the
defense.
The court made clear that “ the
48. Regina v. Ward [1993] 1 W.L.R. 619, 692 (Eng. C.A.).
Judith Ward was released after serving 18 years in prison for
causing several fatal explosions.
Her successful appeal
revealed massive suppression of exculpatory material by
government officials. See Niblett, supra note 31, at 1-3, 7477, 115-16.
49. See Niblett, supra note 31, chs. 9, 10; see also Rowe &
Davis v. United Kingdom (Eur. Comm’n H.R., Oct. 20, 1998),
reprinted in 1999 Crim. L. Rev. 410, 411 (finding it a
violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights for prosecutor to decide nondisclosure of allegedly
sensitive materials without opportunity for trial court
review).
Ward also required the prosecution to notify the
defense of its application for PII, but the Court laid down
exceptions to the notice requirement, which remain in force
after adoption of the CPIA 1996. See Corker, supra note 31, at
115-19; Niblett, supra note 31, at 78-79.
50. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
51. R. v. Saunders & Others (unreported, Central Criminal
Court, Aug. 29, 1989) (“ Guinness 1” ). The opinion is a trial
judge’s opinion, which is neither “ reported” nor published.
The history of the Saunders litigation is referred to in R. v.
Saunders, [1996] 1 Crim. App. 463. See also R. v. Saunders,
1990 Crim. L. Rev. 597 (briefly summarizing the history of the
case).
Published mentions of the “ unreported” opinion of
the trial judge (Henry) may also be found in Niblett, supra
note 31, at 3, 67; Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 154-55 &
nn.12-18; and O’Connor, supra note 31, at 108.

FISHER BP

2000]

04/07/00 11:46 AM

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN POLICE HANDS

115

Guidelines were not confined to statements, but
included any document or information conveyed
orally which had a bearing on the offence charged
or surrounding circumstances.
In short [subject
to
the
PII
exception],
virtually
everything
gathered or created by the investigator was prima
facie disclosable.” 52
Seeking to comply with the Guinness Ruling, the
Crown Prosecution Service in 1992 issued a threepage memorandum, known as the “ Guinness Advice,"53
to chiefs of police throughout the country.
The
Advice made clear that the disclosure duties of
the “ prosecution” extend to police officers and
forensic scientists54 and charged these parties
with
an
obligation
to
preserve
potentially
disclosable material and make it available to the
prosecution. Specifically, it provided that “ [i]n
the course of any enquiry . . . police officers
should maintain a schedule of all material coming
into their possession and should copy that
schedule to the CPS with the case papers.” 55 The
Advice listed a number of categories of material
that should be retained and included in the
schedule, including notes of interviews with
52. Niblett, supra note 31, at 71 (emphasis added).
Although the scope of disclosable material was marginally
narrowed in 1994 to material that was “ relevant or possibly
relevant to an issue in the case,” it remained extremely
broad. Regina v. Keane, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 746, 752. The breadth
of the prosecutor’s disclosure duty is reflected in the Code
of Conduct for barristers, requiring prosecutors to “ ensure
that all relevant evidence is either presented by the
prosecution or made available to the defence.”
Code of
Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, Standard 11.2
(emphasis added).
53. Crown Prosecution Service, Guinness Advice (1992),
reprinted in O’Connor, supra note 31, at 123 [hereinafter
Guinness Advice].
54. Guinness Advice, supra note 53, para. 3.
The courts
also
defined
“ the
prosecution”
broadly
to
include
prosecution experts for purposes of the disclosure obligation.
See Corker, supra note 31, at 38. Although several notorious
English miscarriage cases were attributable to the suppression
of forensic evidence, “ neither the [CPIA 1996] nor the
[Practice] Code addresses the duty of scientists to disclose
[exculpatory]
information,
either
to
the
police
and
prosecutors or to the defence.” Mike Redmayne, Process Gains
and Process Values: The Criminal Procedure and Investigations
Act 1996, 60 Mod. L. Rev. 79, 82-83 (1997).
55. See Guinness Advice, supra note 53, para. 5 (emphasis
added).
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actual
or
potential
witnesses,
suspects,
or
defendants,
statements
taken
from
potential
witnesses “ whether
or
not
they
assist
the
prosecution
case,”
documents
containing
a
description of the alleged criminal by a potential
witness,
crime
reports,
custody
records,
communications
with
forensic
witnesses,
and
materials casting doubt upon the reliability or
consistency of potential witnesses, or upon the
Relevant
reliability
of
a
confession.56
information received orally must be recorded and
The recording and
included on the schedule.57
scheduling duties imposed on police by this
document were carried forward into the CPIA and
Furthermore, the defense
the Code of Practice.58
became entitled under the Act to receive copies of
the
police
schedules
listing
relevant,
nonsensitive
materials
gathered
in
the
investigation.59
As a result of these developments, by the mid1990s the defendant charged with a serious crime
in England was entitled to virtually “ open file”
discovery. He had a right to copy or inspect the
evidence supporting the prosecution’s case, as
well as any relevant “ unused material” that might
“ possibly” be relevant to an issue in the case,
or which might realistically provide a lead to
such evidence.
The sole exception to this right
was through judicial grants of public interest
immunity. But even in such cases, the police were
required to record and reveal the information to
the prosecutor.
B. The Legislative and Political Background to the
CPIA
Law enforcement dissatisfaction with such broad
defense access to unused material was a major
reason for the passage of the 1996 Act. Passed by
a conservative government, the Act’s primary goal
and effect was to restrict defense access to
56. Id. para. 8.
57. See id. para. 9.
58. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 23(1)(b); CPIA Code of
Practice, supra note 33, §§ 5.1-5.5, 6.2.
59. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 2A(3); CPIA Code of Practice,
supra note 33, § 6.3.
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information in police and prosecution files.
At
the same time, by formalizing and expanding police
duties to investigate and record potentially
exculpatory
evidence,
and
to
reveal
it
to
prosecutors, the Act reinforced the prosecutor’s
access to all relevant evidence.
The 1996 Criminal Procedure and Investigations
Act was one of several major pieces of law reform
legislation enacted in England since the mid1980s.
The immediate impetus for many of the
reforms was a series of notorious miscarriages of
justice that attracted public attention in Great
Britain during the past few decades.60 Some arose
out of prosecution for IRA bombings in the 1970s;61
others were ordinary criminal cases.62 A number of
official commissions were appointed to investigate
particular miscarriages and/or to consider the
need for systemic reforms.63 Many of their reform
proposals were enacted into legislation, the most
important of which for our purposes was the Police
and Evidence Act, 1984 (“ PACE” ) and Codes of
PACE reformed police procedures for
Practice.64
60. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
61. For a summary of the history of recent miscarriage cases
in the United Kingdom, and subsequent law reform measures, see
Ashworth, supra note 31, at 11-18; Belloni & Hodgson, supra
note 31, at 1-21; Justice in Error, supra note 31, at 6-13.
The role of non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence as grounds
for reversing some of these convictions, and others, is
discussed in Niblett, supra note 31, at 17-21.
62. See Niblett, supra note 31, at 21-31.
63. See, e.g., Lord Devlin, Report to the Secretary of State
for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee on the
Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (London:
HMSO,
1976)
(reviewing
wrongful
convictions
and
discussing
procedures relating to identification evidence); Runciman
Comm’n Report, supra note 47 (same).
64. See generally Zander, supra note 31 (outlining changes
made under the Act). PACE was enacted following the report of
the Philips Commission, which was appointed in the wake of a
miscarriage of justice in the Confait case, [1975] 62 Crim.
App. 53. See Justice in Error, supra note 31, at 7. There are
five PACE Codes of Practice: Code A (stop and search); Code B
(search and seizure); Code C (detention, treatment and
questioning of suspects); Code D (identification); and Code E
(tape recording of interviews with suspects). See Zander,
supra note 32, at 155.
Another important reform stemming from the 1981 Philips
Commission Report was the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985,
which established the Crown Prosecution Service. See Francis
Bennion, The New Prosecution Arrangements:
The Crown

FISHER BP

118

04/07/00 11:46 AM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

search
and
seizure,
arrest,
detention,
questioning, and charge.65
Despite their origins in public inquiries into
convictions of innocent defendants, many of these
reforms served the “ law and order”
political
agenda of the conservative governments then in
However, these legislative and other
power.66
reforms also led to the adoption of strict recordkeeping requirements for police investigators.
These requirements— particularly under PACE— were
designed to prevent the sort of fabrication or
non-disclosure of evidence that had characterized
some of the most notorious miscarriage cases.
Even
before
enactment
of
the
CPIA,
these
investigative records were made available to
prosecutors and, often, to the accused as well.67
In 1991, the Court of Appeal quashed the IRA pubProsecution Service, 1986 Crim. L. Rev. 3, 9; A. F. Wilcox,
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure:
The Proposed
Prosecution Process, 1981 Crim. L. Rev. 482, 483.
Regarding
other criminal justice reforms enacted in England in the past
decade, see supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
65. PACE section 59 also established a duty solicitor
scheme, providing a mechanism to implement the right of
detained suspects to consult a solicitor at the police
station. See Andrew Saunders & Lee Bridges, The Right to Legal
Advice, in Justice in Error, supra note 31, at 37, 46-47;
Zander, supra note 31, at 107-10.
66. See, e.g., Lee Bridges & Mike McConville, Keeping Faith
With Their Own Convictions: The Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice,
57
Mod.
L.
Rev.
75,
76
(1994)
(discussing
conservative political influences on the 1993 Runciman
Commission
Report);
see
also
infra
notes
69-74
and
accompanying text.
For example, PACE expanded police powers
to stop, search, and detain suspects. See Lee Bridges & Tony
Bunyon, Britain’s New Urban Policing Strategy— the Police and
Criminal Evidence Bill in Context, 10 J.L. & Soc’y 85, 85-94
(1983); Coleman et al., supra note 31, at 18-21.
Also, the
1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act restricted the
accused’s right of silence by allowing comment on his exercise
of the right to remain silent during investigation and at
trial. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, ch.
34(5) (Eng.).
These changes were adopted despite the Royal
Commission’s explicit rejection of them. See Gregory W.
O’Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves
Towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 402, 404, 426-27 (1994).
These restrictions on
the right to silence paved the way for similar provisions in
the CPIA. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (CPIA
sections 5(5) and 11 require the defendant in Crown Court
cases to give a defense statement, and allow comment at trial
on testimony inconsistent with it).
67. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
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bombing convictions in the Birmingham Six case.68
On
the
same
day,
the
government
announced
appointment of a Royal Commission to study the
need for reforms in the criminal justice system.
The Runciman Commission’s Report,69 issued in 1993,
Although
influenced the 1996 Act’s provisions.70
the Commission was established in response to the
problem of wrongful convictions, its technical
mandate,71 and some of its recommendations, gave
greater emphasis to values of crime control. The
Commission was directed, inter alia,
to consider whether changes are needed in (i) the
conduct
of
police
investigations
and
their
supervision by senior police officers . . . ;
(ii) the role of the prosecutor in supervising
the gathering of evidence and deciding whether to
proceed with a case, and the arrangements for the
disclosure
of
material,
including
unused
material, to the defence . . . .72

Both supporters and critics of the existing law
of pretrial disclosure presented testimony before
the Commission, which accepted as valid two
First, the
criticisms of the status quo.73
68. See R. v. McIlkenny & Others, [1992] 2 All E.R. 417, 432
(Eng. C.A.). This followed reversal of murder convictions in
another IRA pub-bombing case, that of the “ Guildford Four.”
See Unreliability of Police Evidence Quashes Convictions: Law
Report, Times (London), October 20, 1989.
69. See Runciman Comm’n Report, supra note 47.
70. Other reform legislation was also inspired by the
Commission’s Report, including the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act, 1994, supra note 68, and the Criminal Appeal Act,
1995.
See
Criminal
Appeal
Act,
ch.
35,
1995
(Eng.)
(establishing the Criminal Cases Review Commission, an
independent body to review claims of wrongful convictions).
The most recent addition to this series of English criminal
justice reform legislation is the Human Rights Act, 1998. See
Sybil D. Sharpe, Article 6 and the Disclosure of Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 1999 Crim. L. Rev. 273, 273 [hereinafter
Sharpe, Article 6].
71. Specifically, it was asked “ to examine the effectiveness
of the criminal justice system . . . in securing the
conviction of those guilty of criminal offences and the
acquittal of those who are innocent, having regard to the
efficient use of resources . . . .” Runciman Comm’n Report,
supra note 47, at 1; see Bridges & McConville, supra note 66,
passim; Sybil Sharpe, Disclosure, Immunity and Fair Trials, 63
J. Crim. L. 67, 67-68 (1999) [hereinafter Sharpe, Disclosure].
72. See Runciman Comm’n Report, supra note 47, at 1.
73. Liberal critics disputed both findings, as well as a
third claim pressed by the government, that broad pretrial
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Commission
found
that
the
defense
could
unnecessarily burden the police and prosecution by
requesting large amounts of material that was of
no genuine importance to the defense.
Given the
sheer volume of potentially relevant material
gathered in an investigation, compliance with such
“ fishing expeditions”
might not be feasible.74
Therefore, strategic defense requests might force
the prosecution to drop charges rather than bear
the costs of compliance.
Second, the Commission
found that by pressing requests for unnecessary
but potentially sensitive material, the defense
could force the prosecution to drop charges rather
than risk the harms resulting from disclosure.75
Implicit in this criticism was dissatisfaction
with
the
existing
safeguards
for
denying
disclosure based upon public interest immunity.76
Based
on
these
findings,
the
Commission
recommended, and Parliament eventually approved, a
new two-stage disclosure scheme that applies,
effectively, to all criminal cases except for
uncontested cases in the magistrates’ courts.77
The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996
and subsidiary Code of Practice also established,
in detail, the duties of police78 to gather and
transmit potentially exculpatory evidence to the
prosecutor.
disclosure led to false “ ambush”
defenses at trial and
unmerited acquittals. See Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 810. Ambush defenses were discussed in the Runciman Commission
Report, supra note 47, at 98. See also Home Office,
Disclosure:
A Consultation Document 15 (1995) (unpublished,
on file with author) (arguing that defense disclosure is
necessary to prevent ambush defenses); JUSTICE, Disclosure: A
Consultation
Paper,
The
JUSTICE
Response
18
(1995)
(unpublished, on file with author) (arguing that concerns
about ambush defenses are unfounded).
74. “ Even in some straightforward cases the amount of
material collected during the course of the investigation can
be voluminous.
In major inquiries, even with computerised
logs . . . it is scarcely possible to be sure that all the
material that has been generated has been listed.” Runciman
Comm’n Report, supra note 47, at 93.
75. See id. 93-94; Redmayne, supra note 54, at 81.
76. See Sharpe, Disclosure, supra note 71, at 68.
77. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 3; see also Niblett, supra
note 31, at 230; Sharpe, Article 6, supra note 70, at 274.
78. The
Act
also
applies
to
criminal
investigations
conducted by officials other than the police. See CPIA, supra
note 32, § 1(4).
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The Code of Practice did not take effect until
April 1, 1997;79 by the time of my visit to England
in the Spring of 1999, it had been in place for
only two years. No systematic studies of the new
Although my
law’s operation had been reported.80
field interviews were limited in number, scope,
and geography,81 they provide some insight into the
issues that can arise in a system taking the
English approach.
C. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
1996
This section will briefly describe how the Act
changes the English law of pretrial discovery. It
will then describe the duties of police to
investigate,
record,
retain,
and
reveal
exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor, both as
prescribed by the Act and as they appear to work
in practice.
1. Disclosure Under the CPIA 1996
The Act does not alter the prosecutor’s duty to
disclose to the defense inculpatory material that
forms part of the prosecution’s case (the “ used”
material).82 However, it replaces the prosecutor’s
common law duty to disclose all of the unused
material with a two-stage reciprocal discovery
scheme.
In the first stage, primary disclosure,
the
prosecution
must
disclose
“ prosecution
79. Different parts of the Act itself went into effect on
different dates. See Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 6.
Before the law went into effect, nationwide training programs
were held, including joint training for prosecutors and police
officers, designed collaboratively by both groups.
80. Informal surveys of experience under the Act had been
conducted among barristers. See British Academy of Forensic
Sciences,
Disclosure
Under
the
Criminal
Procedure
and
Investigations Act 1996 (unpublished papers presented at
seminar chaired by Lord Mackay of Clashfern held at Gray’s
Inn, Dec. 1, 1999) (on file with author); interview with
Superintendent R.K. Golding, Police Representative, Trial
Issues Group, CPS Headquarters, in London, U.K. (Apr. 14,
1999).
81. See supra note 31.
82. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
The Code
presupposes that the police will turn over to the prosecutor a
file containing the material for the prosecution case. See
CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, §§ 7.1, 7.3.
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material” 83 not previously disclosed, which in the
prosecutor’s opinion “ might undermine the case for
The defendant is then
the prosecution.” 84
required— on pain of sanctions85— to disclose his
Defense disclosure is
defense to the charge.86
83. “ Prosecution material” is defined in section 3 of the
Act as including information and objects that are in the
prosecutor’s possession or that he has inspected in connection
with the case. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 3. For an argument
that this definition gives the police effective control over
what is disclosed to the defense, see Leng, Defence
Strategies, supra note 31, at 219.
84. CPIA, supra note 32, § 3(1)(a).
The test for primary
disclosure is not further defined by the Act.
CPS training
materials interpret the test to require disclosure of “ any
material which is capable of having an adverse effect upon the
strength of the prosecution case.” Crown Prosecution Serv.,
Disclosure Under the Criminal Procedure & Investigations Act
1996, at 7 (unpublished Briefing Paper to explain how unused
material is collected, scheduled, and disclosed at the Crown
Court) (on file with the author), and of “ anything that is
inconsistent with an essential part of the prosecution case or
could weaken it in a significant
way . . . .”
Crown
Prosecution Serv., Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
1996, Joint Operational Instructions:
Disclosure of Unused
Material § 3.19 (unpublished, March 24, 1997) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Joint Operational Instructions].
85. The Act permits adverse comment and/or inferences should
the defendant fail to give a timely defense statement, or give
inconsistent defenses, or present a different defense at
trial. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 11.
Other possible
sanctions against the defendant are contained in the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which provides sanctions
relative to the defendant’s silence or statements during
police questioning. See Peter Mirfield, Two Side-Effects of
Sections 34 to 37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994, 1995 Crim. L. Rev. 612, 612-14; Rosemary Pattenden,
Inferences from Silence, 1995 Crim. L. Rev. 602, 607-10. The
CPIA, which makes clear that failure by police to abide by
their duties will neither result in civil or criminal
liability nor in per se loss of the case, see CPIA, supra note
32, §§ 26(2)-(4), has been criticized for including sanctions
for noncompliance only against the defense. See Leng & Taylor,
supra note 31, at 24-25, 39-42. In Parliamentary debate, the
government had argued in favor of relying on the Bar’s Code of
Conduct and the Code for Crown Prosecutors to ensure that
correct ethical standards would be applied. See Sharpe,
Disclosure, supra note 71, at 79-80.
86. Before the Act, the defendant was obliged to disclose
only alibi defenses and his intention to present expert
evidence. See Criminal Justice Act, 1967, ch. 80, § ll (Eng.).
Expanded defense disclosure under the CPIA was designed to
narrow the issues for trial, to avoid costly “ fishing
expeditions”
by the defense and last minute “ ambush”
defenses, and to allow the government to confine further
disclosure to material actually relevant to contested issues.
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compulsory in cases tried on indictment, and
optional in cases tried summarily; in both
situations the right to secondary disclosure is
conditioned upon prior defense disclosure.87 After
the defendant has made disclosure, the prosecutor
must make secondary disclosure to the defense of
material that “ might be reasonably expected to
assist the accused’s defence” as disclosed by the
At both the primary and
defense statement.88
secondary
disclosure
stages,
the
prosecutor
applies the applicable tests to both “ nonsensitive”
and
“ sensitive”
materials.89
Regarding the latter, the Act preserves the
judicially administered exception to disclosure
based on the common law doctrine of public
interest immunity.90
See Runciman Comm’n Report, supra note 47, at 96.
Critics
attacked the requirement of broadened defense disclosure as
shifting the burden of proof and undermining the presumption
of innocence. See Redmayne, supra note 54, at 84-86.
87. See CPIA, supra note 32, §§ 5-6. Defense disclosure is
made by giving a statement to the court and prosecutor setting
forth:
(a) in general terms the nature of the accused’s
defense; (b) the matters on which he takes issue with the
prosecution; and (c) for each matter, the reason why he takes
issue with the prosecution. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 5(6);
Niblett, supra note 31, at 236-38.
88. CPIA, supra note 32, § 7(2)(a).
Examples given by the
CPS of such material include relevant material that might:
(a) assist the defense to cross-examine prosecution witnesses,
as to credit and/or to substance; (b) enable the defense to
call evidence or advance a line of enquiry or argument; or (c)
explain or mitigate the defendant’s actions. See Joint
Operational Instructions, supra note 84, at § 3.40.
For
criticism of the secondary disclosure test, see Leng & Taylor,
supra note 31, at 19-20, and Niblett, supra note 31, at 23941.
89. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
90. See CPIA, supra note 32, at §§ 3(6), 7(5), 21(2); CPIA
Code of Practice, supra note 33, §§ 6.1, 6.12; supra notes 4950 and accompanying text. The Act arguably extends the Public
Interest
Immunity
exception
beyond
the
narrow
bounds
previously enforced in criminal cases.
Thus, in especially sensitive circumstances, the prosecutor
can apply for pubic interest immunity from disclosure without
notice to the defense. Under the Act, however, the prosecutor
need only obtain court approval for non-disclosure of material
that, in the prosecutor’s view, satisfies the test for primary
or secondary disclosure. See Sharpe, Disclosure, supra note
71, at 67, 69-70 (noting that one aim and effect of Act was to
exempt much sensitive material from judicial consideration);
see also Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note 31, at 222
(recognizing that Code § 6.12, giving “ examples” of material
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The new law radically restricts defense access to
the unused material possessed by the prosecution.
The defendant’s
initial access depends entirely
upon prosecutorial screening of police files under
a subjective test.91 Secondary access also depends
upon prosecutorial screening, this time under an
objective test that is subject, on application by
Such secondary
the defense, to judicial review.92
access,
however,
is
conditioned
upon
the
defendant’s disclosure of his defense.93
From my inquiries it appears that the Act’s
essential premise— that police and prosecutors can
be relied upon to screen the unused material for
exculpatory
evidence— remains
deeply
To critics of the Act, the
controversial.94
substitution of prosecutorial screening of unused
materials
for
defense
screening
gives
the
responsibility to locate exculpatory evidence to
those least capable, and least motivated, to find
For this reason, liberal critics contend
it.95
that may be considered sensitive, broadens the concept of
public interest beyond that previously reflected in the
criminal case law).
91. Section 3 of the Act requires the prosecutor to disclose
material “ which in the prosecutor’s opinion might undermine
the case for the prosecution.” CPIA, supra note 32, § 3(1)(a)
(emphasis added). This subjective test is “ designed to rule
out the possibility of judicial review,” whereas the accused
may “ challenge prosecution disclosure (or the lack of it)
after secondary disclosure (s. 8).” Leng & Taylor, supra note
31, at 13.
92. See Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 13. CPIA section 8
(and court rules) permits a defendant who has given a defense
statement, and who has reasonable cause to believe that
prosecution material exists that meets the test for secondary
disclosure, to seek a court order against the prosecutor. See
Niblett, supra note 31, at 240-41.
On the limitations of
judicial review under the Act as an effective remedy for
incomplete
prosecution
disclosure,
see
Leng,
Defence
Strategies, supra note 31, at 221-23.
93. See supra note 86.
94. See, e.g., Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note 31, at
216-18 (discussing the revolutionary nature of the changes in
disclosure law).
Controversy also surrounds the Act’s
provision for non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory
evidence based upon public interest immunity. See id. at 22123.
Also, considerable uncertainty exists regarding defense
access to materials in the possession of third parties,
including private entities such as hospitals, and public
agencies such as social service agencies.
95. See, e.g., Sharpe, Disclosure, supra note 71, at 79-80.
Professor Sharpe further explains the potential problem:
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that the Act’s pendulum has swung too far in favor
of the government.
They complain that the Act
gives the police primary control over disclosure,
that the police are neither able nor motivated to
identify potentially exculpatory material, and
that prosecutors are too overworked to monitor the
They also contend that the tests
police role.96
for
primary
and
secondary
disclosure
are
defective,97 that the exceptions to disclosure
based on public interest immunity are too broad,
and
that
the
procedural
safeguards
against
improper
grants
of
immunity
are
inadequate.
Consequently, critics predict that the Act’s
regime will produce a new round of miscarriages of
A fundamental concern underlying the CPIA is the
significant onus placed upon the police to discern,
record, retain and reveal to the prosecutor any
information
that
“ may
be
relevant”
to
the
investigation. . . . Not only does this assume a sound
working knowledge of evidentiary principles on the part
of the police, it leads to an inverted “ bottom up”
decision-making structure with low-ranking officers
having the greatest amount of discretion.
It is only
after police determinations have been made, that
prosecutorial discretion in determining whether the
material might undermine the case for the prosecution,
or reasonably assist the accused’s defence, comes into
play.
Id. at 79.
96. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 164-67; Leng, Defence
Strategies, supra note 31, at 225; Sharpe, Disclosure, at 71,
79-80; British Academy of Forensic Sciences, Disclosure Under
the
Criminal
Procedure
and
Investigations
Act
1996
(unpublished papers presented at Seminar chaired by Lord
Mackay of Clashfern at Gray’s Inn, Dec. 1, 1999) (on file with
author); interview with defense solicitor in London, U.K.
(Apr. 14, 1999).
97. The primary disclosure test has been criticized as
overly vague, unworkable, and essentially indistinguishable
from the test for secondary disclosure. See Leng & Taylor,
supra note 31, at 12-15; Sharpe, Disclosure, supra note 71, at
71-73.
Also, because the test is subjective, and therefore
may be insulated from court review, prosecutors have little
incentive to construe it broadly. See Redmayne, supra note 54,
at 81. The Runciman Commission had recommended much broader
primary disclosure of:
all material relevant to the offence or to the offender
or to the surrounding circumstances of the case,
whether or not the prosecution intend to rely upon that
material. . . . In addition, the prosecution should
inform the defence at this stage of the existence of
any other material obtained during the course of the
inquiry into the offence in question.
Runciman Comm’n Report, supra note 47, at 95-96.
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justice like those that previously led the courts
to give defense counsel direct access to the
Police and prosecutors, in
police files.98
contrast, generally approve the balance struck in
the Act between protection of innocent defendants
and efficient prosecution of the guilty.
They
blame problems in operation of the Act on the
failure of other actors in the system, including
They have also
judges, to follow its dictates.99
protested the costly burden of paperwork required
by PACE and the CPIA.100
From an American observer’s point of view,
however, another aspect of the English system is
noteworthy:
in serious, contested cases, the Act
gives
prosecutors
access
to
police-prepared
schedules that list all relevant material gathered
in the investigation.
Except for separate
schedules of “ sensitive” materials, the defense
In
also receives copies of these schedules.101
deciding disclosure issues, the prosecutor has the
right to inspect all of the materials listed in
98. See interviews with defense solicitors in Birmingham,
U.K. (Apr. 13 and Apr. 21, 1999); supra notes 42-49 and
accompanying text.
99. Police complain about the lack of compliance by defense
lawyers who fail to provide detailed defense statements, and
by judges who, without requiring such statements, order the
prosecution to give the defense blanket access to police
files. See interview with defense solicitor in London, U.K.
(Apr. 14, 1999); interview with Principal Crown Prosecutor,
Casework Services Division, CPS Headquarters, London, in
London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999); interview with Superintendent
R.K. Golding, Police Representative, Trial Issues Group, CPS
Headquarters, London, in London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999).
Prosecutors blame the police for inadequately screening the
unused material for exculpatory material. As a result, judges
distrust the adequacy of police screening, and pressure
prosecutors to allow the defense direct access to police
files, in order to do the screening themselves.
100. See interviews with staff at West Mercia Constabulary
Headquarters, Training and Development, in Hindlip, Worcester,
U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999); see also Alan Mackie et al., Preparing
the Prosecution Case, 1999 Crim. L. Rev. 460, 462 (reporting
that police in 1993 asserted they were being “ strangled by
paperwork”
as
the
result
of
PACE
and
file-keeping
requirements).
101. Of course, access to the schedules is not the same as
access to items listed on the schedule. The defense may only
examine the actual items themselves by consent of the
prosecution, or, after disclosure of the defense statement, by
court order under CPIA section 8. See infra text accompanying
notes 160-173.

FISHER BP

2000]

04/07/00 11:46 AM

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN POLICE HANDS

127

the schedules.
These formal mechanisms for
revealing the fruits of police investigation, both
inculpatory and exculpatory, to the prosecutor,
contrast starkly with the informal, low-visibility
and
unstructured
links
between
police
and
prosecution that characterize American practice.
2. Duties of the Police
The prosecutor’s disclosure duties under the Act
apply to material in the prosecutor’s possession,
or which has been revealed to him by police
The CPIA Code of Practice103
investigators.102
describes the police duties to ensure that the
prosecutor becomes aware of all relevant fruits of
the investigation.
These duties consist of
general responsibilities, the duty to investigate
exculpatory as well as inculpatory leads, and the
duties to record, retain, and reveal relevant
information to the prosecutor.
We shall discuss
these duties in turn, both as they are defined by
law and as they appear to work in practice.
a. General Responsibilities
In every criminal investigation the chief of
police must designate an officer to function as
the disclosure officer.104 The officer in charge of
an
investigation
must
ensure
that
proper
procedures
are
in
place
for
recording
and
retaining investigative material,105 and that all
relevant material is made available to the
The disclosure officer is
disclosure officer.106
responsible for examining investigative material
retained by the police, revealing it to the
prosecutor, and formally certifying that he has
done this. In routine cases, the investigator and
disclosure officer might often be the same person.
102. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 3.2.
103. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33.
104. See id. §§ 3.1-3.6; Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 4243.
Civilian employees of the department may also serve in
this capacity.
The chief must also designate officers to
serve as the officer in charge of the investigation, and as
the investigator. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 34, §§
3.1-3.3.
105. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 34, § 2.1.
106. See id. § 3.3.

FISHER BP

128

04/07/00 11:46 AM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

In a major inquiry, where many officers might be
brought in to the investigation, a separate person
will usually be appointed disclosure officer, and
all the investigating team members will funnel
In some forces, once the
information to him.107
investigation is complete and a charge filed, the
investigators will hand over responsibility for
disclosure to an “ administrative support unit”
within the force.108
b. Duty to Investigate Exculpatory as well as
Inculpatory Leads
Miscarriages of justice can result from one-sided
investigations because they ignore evidence that
might contradict belief in the prime suspect’s
To avoid this risk, section 23(1)(a) of
guilt.109
the Act provides, for the first time, that police
must take “ all reasonable steps . . . for the
purposes of the investigation,” 110 and the Code
requires investigators to “ pursue all reasonable
lines of inquiry, whether these point towards or
away from the suspect.” 111
107. See id. § 3.1-3.3; interview with Crown Prosecutor, in
Coventry, U.K. (Apr. 6, 1999).
108. These units, also known as Criminal Justice Support
Units (“ CJSU” ), were created to relieve uniformed officers
of the administrative burdens of final file preparation. They
may be staffed by civilians. See Michael Maguire & Clive
Norris, The Conduct and Supervision of Criminal Investigations
36 (Royal Comm’n on Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 5,
1992); see also John Baldwin & Adrian Hunt, Prosecutors
Advising in Police Stations, 1998 Crim. L. Rev. 521, 531-32
(discussing the difficulties faced by administrative support
units); interviews with staff at West Mercia Constabulary
Headquarters, Training and Development, in Hindlip, Worcester,
U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999).
109. See Barrie Irving & Colin Dunnighan, Human Factors in
the Quality Control of CID Investigations 12 (Royal Comm’n on
Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 21, 1993) (describing four
stages of police investigation: first, police gather evidence
to define one or more prime suspects; second, police identify
and arrest suspects; third, police establish a case against
the suspect sufficient to meet the test of prosecution;
fourth, if police fail at step three, they repeat it; if they
are partially successful, they try to find more evidence).
110. CPIA, supra note 32, § 23(1)(a).
111. CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 3.4 (“ What is
reasonable in each case will depend on the particular
circumstances.” ).
This
requirement
implements
recommendations of the Royal Commission. See Runciman Comm’n
Report, supra note 47, ch. 2, para. 13 (stating that even if a
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The practical impact of this new duty remains to
be
seen.
According
to
Roger
Leng,
this
requirement, added late to the Bill, might be seen
“ as a cynical attempt to appease the opposition
whilst falling short of enforceability by the
Several informants described this
courts.” 112
provision as unenforceable, and therefore unlikely
to affect police behavior.113 However, as Mr. Leng
notes, a court might exclude evidence114 or stay
proceedings115 if police disregard the duty. Also,
the defense might raise questions before the jury
as to why the police did not explore alternative
hypotheses.
My interviews with police suggest
that the fear of adverse consequences at trial
might motivate police in serious cases to comply
with the duty, as in the following case.
A woman was charged with the stabbing murder of
suspect has already confessed, police should interview “ as
many witnesses to the offence as practicable, including any
whom the suspect suggests may be able to exonerate him or
her” ); cf. Standards Relating to the Administration of
Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.11(c) (3d. ed. 1992) (“ A
prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution’s
case or aid the accused.” ); Note, Toward a Constitutional
Right to an Adequate Police Investigation:
A Step Beyond
Brady, supra note 27, at 842-48 (discussing police duty to
investigate under the Sixth Amendment). In the United States,
a defendant may elicit evidence at trial to establish the
inadequacy of the police investigation in failing to pursue
exculpatory leads. See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 708 N.E.2d
658, 662 (Mass. 1999).
112. Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note 31, at 224.
113. See interviews with Crown Prosecutor, in Coventry, U.K.
(Apr. 6, 1999); interview with Principal Crown Prosecutor,
Casework Services Division, CPS Headquarters, in London, U.K.
(Apr. 14, 1999).
114. Section 78 of PACE authorizes courts to refuse to admit
prosecution
evidence
if,
“ having
regard
to
all
the
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would
have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings
that the court ought not to admit it.” Police and Criminal
Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 78 (Eng.).
The defense might argue
for exclusion, Leng suggests, “ where the accused’s ability to
answer [the prosecution] evidence is substantially prejudiced
as a result of the failure of the police to follow up
available lines of inquiry favouring the accused.”
Leng,
Defence Strategies, supra note 31, at 229.
115. Courts have the power to stay the proceedings if, as the
result of government abuse of the process, the accused cannot
receive a fair trial. See Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note
31, at 229-30.
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the man who was driving the car in which she was a
passenger.
She claimed that a car with two men
had pursued the victim’s car, and one of the
pursuers fought with and stabbed the victim. She
described the route and the two men.
Because
witnesses saw the victim’s car en route with no
car in pursuit, the police doubted the woman’s
story.
But the police published her description
of the two men, appealing for public help.
Members of the public phoned in the names of 70
suspects fitting the descriptions.
Because the
police feared cross examination at trial regarding
why they did not pursue this “ reasonable line of
inquiry,”
the police investigated all 70, and
The police might have
excluded them all.116
investigated the defendant’s claim even if they
had no duty to do so under the Act, but the
existence of the duty might give more strength to
a defense argument at trial that the investigation
was defective.
The
requirement
that
police
“ pursue
all
reasonable lines of inquiry”
also invites the
defense proactively to request that the police
investigate particular alternative hypotheses.117
In cases in which the police believe the grounds
for such a request are baseless, they might be
placed in a dilemma:
whether to spend scarce
investigative resources or risk embarrassment at
trial
for
refusing
to
take
“ reasonable”
This requirement may
investigative steps.118
therefore lend itself to strategic manipulation by
the defense.
On the other hand, by giving the
defense a modest call on finite investigative
116. The police also recorded the statement of another
witness, who at the time of the “ pursuit” heard two cars
race past his window, which faced a road near, but not on, the
route that the defendant had described. This was disclosed to
the defense which, without notice, argued at trial that the
defendant and victim had followed this other route. See
interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West Mercia Police
H.Q., in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999).
117. A defense lawyer predicted that defense solicitors in
child abuse prosecutions, who lack the ability to compel
production of child welfare agency records, will request the
police to “ do their job”
by reviewing the records for
exculpatory material. See interview with defense solicitor in
London, U.K. (Apr. 12, 1999).
118. See interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West
Mercia Police H.Q., in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999).
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resources largely controlled by the state, the Act
may enhance the likelihood of a more balanced,
impartial investigation.
Also, to forestall
abuse, the prosecution may look to the trial judge
to exclude questions or arguments referring to
police
failure
to
take
“ unreasonable”
investigative steps.119
c. Duty to Record Potentially Exculpatory
Information
Since 1992, administrative guidelines issued by
the Crown Prosecution Service have required the
police to maintain schedules of all investigative
materials coming into their possession and provide
The
copies of the schedules to the CPS.120
guidelines listed a number of categories of
material that should be retained and included in
the schedules, including notes of interviews with
actual
or
potential
witnesses,
suspects,
or
defendants,
statements
taken
from
potential
witnesses “ whether
or
not
they
assist
the
prosecution
case,”
documents
containing
a
description of the alleged criminal by a potential
witness,
crime
reports,
custody
records,
communications
with
forensic
witnesses,
and
materials casting doubt upon the reliability or
consistency of potential witnesses, or upon the
Relevant
reliability
of
a
confession.121
information received orally had to be recorded and
included on the schedule.122
The 1996 Act gave legislative force to this
previous duty established by the guidelines:
police must record, retain, and reveal to the
prosecutor in schedule form, all “ material” 123
119. See
Donald
A.
Dripps,
Relevant
But
Prejudicial
Exculpatory Evidence:
Rationality Versus Jury Trial and the
Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1389, 1399
(1996) (arguing that a judge’s power to exclude prejudicial
exculpatory evidence safeguards state interest in accurate
fact-finding against the danger of irrational acquittals).
120. See Guinness Advice, supra note 53, at 124-25.
The
Guinness Advice is also discussed supra at notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
121. See Guinness Advice, supra note 53, at 125.
122. See id. at 126.
123. “ Material” includes both information and objects. See
CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 2.1.
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that “ may be relevant to the investigation.” 124
The Act futher defines “ material” as information
that appears to have “ some bearing on any offence
under
investigation
or
any
person
being
investigated, or on the surrounding circumstances
of the case, unless it is incapable of having any
When relevant,
impact on the case . . . .” 125
police must also record negative information, such
as a witness’s failure to observe an alleged
occurrence.126
The importance of the recording requirement
cannot be overstated: unless exculpatory evidence
is recorded, it may be lost forever to a suspect
who later seeks to establish his innocence.
Opinions differ on the extent to which the police
actually comply with this duty under the Act; it
is easy, after all, not to write something down.
Until
credible
studies
are
conducted
of
investigation under the Act, the extent of
compliance cannot be known.
However, certain
observations of the English experience can be
made.
First, the recording duty conflicts with a strong
police tendency not to write down information that
This tension
the police do not want disclosed.127
is most likely to arise in cases involving
sensitive information, such as the existence of an
informant. The Act requires police to reveal the
existence of relevant, sensitive, unused material
to the prosecutor, who, if the material is
otherwise
disclosable,
must
apply
for
court
authorization to withhold it from the defense.128
Second,
in
complex
criminal
investigations
involving the use of HOLMES,129 comprehensive
records of relevant information are made and
preserved.
This
illustrates
the
incidental
124. Id. §§ 4.1-4.4; Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 43-44.
Recording may be in writing or electronic form, and must be
done contemporaneously, i.e., “ at the time it is obtained or
as soon as practicable after that time.”
CPIA Code of
Practice, supra note 33, §§ 4.1, 4.4.
125. CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 2.1.
126. See id. § 4.3.
127. See interview with senior Crown Prosecutor, in Abingdon,
U.K. (Apr. 18, 1999).
128. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 3(6).
129. “ HOLMES” records are described in Appendix A, infra
notes 354-67 and accompanying text.
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benefit to defendants of a system adopted in order
to enhance investigative efficiency by requiring
records to be made of “ everything” learned in an
investigation.
Third, several of my informants believed that the
Act had made police more conscious of their duty
to record and reveal exculpatory evidence.130 They
believed that training programs, reinforced by the
threat of disciplinary sanctions, are causing
police to internalize the norms established by the
Act.
My visit to a regional police training
Because it
facility131 illustrated this process.
struck me as remarkable compared to the training
that I suspect occurs in most American police
academies, I describe it in some detail.
I attended a regularly scheduled class on the
CPIA for eight probationary police constables who
had served as police officers for eighteen
All of the officers had experience
months.132
investigating and preparing files in their own
criminal cases.
In addition, each had at some
time been assigned to a special administrative
130. As one experienced Crown Prosecutor said, the Act
“ concentrates the police mind on unused material.” As a
result, the police record more than they did previously, and
some of what they record favors the defense. See interview
with senior Crown Prosecutor, in Abingdon, U.K (Apr. 18,
1999).
However, police often report “ negative”
evidence in
ambiguous terms that conceal its true import. For example, in
a burglary case police testified that “ fingerprint checks at
point of entry were negative.”
Both prosecutors and defense
counsel thought that this meant that police had found no
prints. In fact, prints had been found, but they turned out
not to belong to the defendant, nor to any other known person.
(The defendant’s prints were on the items taken in the
burglary, but he claimed he had found the items on the
street.) When this fact came out after trial, the CPS did not
oppose defendant’s appeal of his conviction. According to my
informant, the police must be trained to report more
specifically what they mean by a “ negative” investigative
result. See interview with Principal Crown Prosecutor,
Casework Services Division, CPS Headquarters, in London, U.K.
(Apr. 14, 1999).
131. The training occurred at West Mercia Constabulary
Headquarters. The West Mercia region is made up of rural areas
and small towns, and encompasses Shropshire, Worcestershire,
and Herefordshire. The region’s largest city has a population
of 200,000.
132. New police constables spend their first two years of
service as probationers.
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unit in her force, whose task was to prepare case
files and evidence for submission to the CPS.133
After I was given an opportunity to introduce
myself to the class and explain my interest, the
instructor led a discussion on the group’s
understanding of the Act and their experiences
under it.
Discussion focused on the duty to pursue, record,
and
retain
“ negative”
evidence.
Several
participants related instances in which they had
encountered and recorded such evidence.
One told
of a case in which “ every witness gave a different
account.”
Accordingly,
he
submitted
their
statements to the prosecutor, along with comments
on their unreliability.
Another told of a
“ violent disorder” case in which two lineups were
held but the suspect was not identified; he had
recorded this.134 A third told how, in an assault
case, bloody boots were seized, bagged incorrectly
in plastic, and not promptly sent for blood
analysis.
As a result, they were useless as
evidence.
The officer recorded the “ whole
shambles” about the boots in the file. While none
of
these
police
actions
in
themselves
is
remarkable,
it
is
significant
that
the
participants saw their actions as examples of
compliance with their duty to record, retain, and
reveal information that undermines the prosecution
133. These are known as Criminal Justice Support Units
(“ CJSUs” ) or Administrative Support Units (“ ASUs” ).
In
forces where they exist, the CJSUs assume the functions of the
disclosure officer once the investigation has been completed
and the charge filed.
These units were created to relieve
uniformed officers of the administrative burdens of final file
preparation. See interviews with various staff at West Mercia
Constabulary Headquarters, Training and Development, in
Hindlip, Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999); see also Baldwin &
Hunt, supra note 108, at 531-32 (discussing difficulties
encountered by the ASUs); Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at
36 (same).
134. I do not know why this officer, who was apparently
conducting the investigation, was also involved in the
identification
procedures.
See
supra
notes
64-67
and
accompanying text (PACE requires independent identification
officer to administer identification procedures and record
results). Also, because PACE entitles the defense lawyer to
be present at the lineup, the lawyer would know of the nonidentification; therefore, police recording of the fact would
not greatly benefit the defense. I am grateful to Roger Leng
for bringing the last point to my attention.
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case.
At some point in the discussion, the instructor
played devil’s advocate: “ You have 52 cards. Two
are the wrong color. What do you do with the two?
You have a statement that helps the defense. You
have seen the victim. You know that the defendant
is guilty. Why not tear up the statement?”
The
group’s responses included comments like, “ Because
it’s a legal document, you can’t;” “ It wouldn’t
be fair;” “ It’s not our job to be judge and jury;
at the end of the day, we never know who did it;”
“ If you start with a minor breach of the rules,
where do you stop?”
Some brought up the possible
sanctions for failure to comply with the Act’s
commands.135 Accusing them of talking like boy
scouts and girl scouts, the instructor asked
whether they had not seen more experienced
officers “ bend” the rules.
A couple reported
that other officers sometimes bent PACE rules
restricting the power to stop and search suspects,
but none reported seeing the CPIA rules “ bent.”
The class then watched a videotape of a simulated
crime. A young man snatched the victim’s purse as
she was standing on the street, and ran.
The
victim and an eyewitness described the perpetrator
to an officer at the scene. A suspect who fit the
descriptions was questioned, and his photograph
was identified both by the victim and the
eyewitness.
The victim telephoned the police on
the next day and retracted her identification— it
“ happened so fast,”
she “ couldn’t be sure.”
Must her retraction be reduced to writing?
Yes.
Why?
It is relevant information, which must be
scheduled, supplied to the prosecutor, and flagged
as meeting the test of “ primary disclosure” —
i.e., it undermines the case for the prosecution.136
135. The sanctions raised in class discussion included losing
the chance to convict a guilty accused, internal discipline,
and criminal liability.
In fact, the Act insulates police
from civil or criminal liability simply for violating their
duties under the Code. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 26(2).
Training materials mention the following possible consequences
for failures to comply: release of the accused from the duty
to make defense disclosure, acquittal of the accused, reversal
of a conviction, awarding of costs against the prosecution,
and
disciplinary
proceedings.
See
Joint
Operational
Instructions, supra note 84, § 1.24.
136. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 7.3
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After primary disclosure is made to the defense,
the video continues with the defendant submitting
a “ defence statement” claiming alibi: he was in
a certain café with a friend at the time of the
incident.
The defense statement also blames the
crime on youths from a certain housing project.
The police interview the proprietor of a shop
adjacent to the scene of the crime who confirms
that youths from that project had been hanging
around his shop shortly before the crime.
Must
the police record and reveal that statement to the
prosecutor?
Yes, because it is relevant (though
“ negative” ) material.
Also, because it “ might
be reasonably expected to assist the [accused’s
defence]” 137 as disclosed by the defense statement,
it should be flagged to the prosecutor as meeting
the test of secondary disclosure.
Further
investigation destroys the defendant’s alibi: the
owner of the café where the defendant claims to
have been tells the police that the café was
closed for renovations on the day of the crime.
The value of training such as I observed is
difficult to determine, but there is good reason
to doubt its efficacy.
As Mike McConville and
colleagues
have
shown,
the
police
possess
overwhelming
power
to
magnify
and
create
inculpatory facts, and to suppress exculpatory
facts.138 Many reasons exist for them to do so in
the service of their own institutional goals and
(requiring police to give the prosecutor a copy of “ any
material casting doubt on the reliability of a witness” ).
137. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 8.2.
138. In the words of Mike McConville:
Of course it is commonly thought that evidence is
‘discovered’ by the police and that such discoveries
are the mark of a good investigator. . . . [I]n a very
real sense, the police construct evidence . . . . The
police have, at a most fundamental level, the ability
to select facts, to reject facts, to not seek facts, to
evaluate facts and to generate facts.
Facts, in this
sense,
are
not
objective
entities
which
exist
independently of the social actors but are created by
them.
McConville et al., supra note 31, at 56.
Through case file
reviews and interviews with officials, the authors studied the
processing of over 1000 cases by the police, prosecutors, and
courts. See id. at 1. The authors argue that “ the creation
of evidence in one way or another is not a deviant police act
but a standard form of production.
The processes of
production . . . are all-pervasive.” Id. at 87.
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For example, resource limitations
constraints.139
commonly create pressure for speedy closure of
Also, police are vulnerable to
investigations.140
“ confirmatory
bias,”
the
well-known
general
tendency to “ seek out or selectively attend to
information which confirms what they believe or
‘know’ to be the case,”
while ignoring or
dismissing information that contradicts their
theory.141 Also, especially in high profile cases,
investigators may be motivated to build a case
against a suspect.
As one experienced defense
lawyer said, “ I trust the constable on the street
to write things down.
But in a big case,
involving the CID, trying to build a case against
a suspect, that’s who I don’t trust.” 142
All of these tendencies are supported by the
culture of policing, which discourages “ rocking
the boat”
by “ question[ing] the quality or
propriety of other officers’ conduct, decision-

139. The police “ create” facts to justify case decisions
that foster police goals such as maintenance of public order
and
police
authority,
satisfaction
of
the
wishes
of
influential segments of community, and insulation of the
police from criticism. See id. at 25-29, 65, 97-98.
140. “ Records . . . are always directed towards closure. The
privileged status accorded police accounts generally ensures
that closure takes place by suppressing and delegitimating
alternative accounts.” Id. at 81; see also Roger Ede & Eric
Shepherd, Active Defence:
A Lawyer’s Guide to Police and
Defence Investigation and Prosecution and Defence Disclosure
in Criminal Cases 64-65 (1998) (discussing police bias toward
“ attaching criminality to an individual” whom police believe
has committed a crime).
141. See Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 64; Randy Borum
et al., Improving Clinical Judgment and Decision Making in
Forensic Evaluation, 21 J. Psychiatry & L. 35, 47-48 (1993).
McConville and his colleagues describe how this occurs in
practice:
In constructing cases to fit the decisions the police
wish to make, the police adopt an adversarial role.
Their job is to build the strongest possible case
against the defendant. Naturally they do not choose to
help defendants, by drawing out their legal defences or
emotional problems for instance, but they are not
required to by any law or set of guidelines.
McConville et al, supra note 31, at 181; see also id. at 77
(noting that in police interrogation, “ [w]here the suspect
asserts innocence or introduces evidence which would support a
defence, this is generally ignored” ).
142. Interview with defense lawyer, in Birmingham, U.K. (Apr.
13, 1999). “ CID” refers to the detective unit.
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In an attempt
making, actions and attitudes.” 143
to counter the tendency to build one-sided cases
against presumptively guilty suspects, since early
1993 all police in England have been trained in
the
“ PEACE”
model
of
investigative
interviewing.144 Adopted jointly by the Home Office
and the Association of Chief Police Officers,
PEACE obligates police, when taking statements,
“ to confront contradictions or anomalies and,
where these cannot be resolved, to include these
in
the
document— not
to
edit
them
out.” 145
Unfortunately, despite extensive PEACE training,
officers’
“ witness
interviewing
remains
the
Achilles’
heel
of
police
investigations.” 146
Empirically, Roger Ede and Eric Shepherd note that
“ [r]esearch,
particularly
that
based
upon
recordings of officers interviewing witnesses,
shows that witness interviewing and its product—
witness statements— leave a lot to be desired.” 147
Among the reasons for this conclusion, the authors
mention the disinclination of police to take full
notes or use tape recording. This enables police
to
prevent
later
scrutiny
of
manipulative
interviewing techniques designed to produce “ good
statements,” i.e., statements that are plausible,
consistent, and inculpatory.148
While these reports are discouraging, it does not
143. Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 67. Opinions differ
as to whether, or to what extent, the culture of policing in
England has changed since the introduction of PACE in 1984.
One police official reported that officers who did not like
the new rules left the police, and those that stayed learned
to accept and obey the new rules. See interview with training
instructor at West Mercia Constabulary Headquarters, Training
and Development, in Hindlip, Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999).
144. “ PEACE” is an acronym standing for different stages of
the interview process. See Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at
40.
The training consists of a five-day course. See id. at
60. For further details regarding the requirements of PEACE,
see id. at 40-50; see also id. at 59 (citing Police Staff
College, Bramshill, A Guide to Interviewing (1996), as a
source of PEACE guidelines).
145. Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 79.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 79-82.
The authors also criticize police
practices
in
obtaining
descriptions
of
suspects
from
witnesses, and in failing to take statements from witnesses
whose information would not support the police theory of the
case. See id. at 83-86.
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necessarily
follow
that
training
in
PEACE
guidelines and CPIA requirements is not worth the
cost.
The crucial questions are whether it is
possible to heighten police sensitivity to the
risk of wrongful convictions and to the value of
recording
negative
information,
and
whether
sufficient incentives can be created to induce
police to follow such recording requirements. The
answers to these difficult questions do not
It does appear, however, that training
exist.149
both in the classroom and in the field strongly
reinforces the Act’s detailed normative framework
for the recording of exculpatory evidence.150 To my
knowledge, neither such a detailed framework nor
any comparable training effort exists in the
United States.151
149. McConville and his colleagues are highly skeptical of
the proposition that a change in the law can bring about
change in police investigating and reporting practices. See
McConville et al., supra note 31, at 198-208; see also Russell
Hogg, The Politics of Criminal Investigation, in Social Theory
and Legal Politics 120, 126 (Gary Wickham ed., 1987) (denying
that law “ can direct police work in any meaningful sense” ).
If, however, one can alter police goals, their conduct in
recording and reporting investigations will follow.
See
Brown, PACE Ten Years On, supra note 31, at 243-56 (concluding
from studies of the impact of PACE that new legal rules can
alter existing police practices provided they are clear,
accompanied by adequate training, backed up by effective
sanctions and supervision, and that the public is aware of its
rights); Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop:
Using
Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 389, 429-30 (1999) (advocating use of training
and mentoring programs to change police attitudes toward
acceptability of lying); see also Christopher Slobogin, Why
Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 363, 392-400 (arguing that entity liability of police
departments promotes systemic deterrence, achieved through
training and internal discipline).
150. Verbal expressions of opinion by probationers in a
training class, in the presence of a stranger like myself, are
obviously not reliable predictors of behavior on the job.
Nonetheless, I was impressed with the honesty, sincerity, and
maturity of the group members.
Granted, they were an
unrepresentative group on a number of counts.
They had
operated under the CPIA since entering the force; officers
with longer service might have had more resistant attitudes.
Also, police working in urban environments, where drugs,
gangs, and more serious crimes are prevalent, could be
expected to view the Act differently than the rural and smalltown police I met.
This distinction might also apply to
detectives (CID), as opposed to constables.
151. I am aware of no empirical study of police training in
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d. The Police Duty to Retain Exculpatory Evidence
Police must retain recorded information that
“ may
be
relevant
to
the
investigation,” 152
including the following categories of potentially
police reports, police
relevant material:153
notebook entries, custody records, information
from
tapes
or
telephone
messages
containing
descriptions of an offence or offender, witness
statements— both the final versions and any draft
versions “ where their content differs from the
final version” — records of interviews with actual
or
potential
witnesses
and
suspects,
communications between police and experts, “ any
material casting doubt on the reliability of a
confession . . . [or] a witness,” and any other
material that might undermine the case for the
In the words of one police
prosecution.154
official, “ we must keep everything,” including
“ jottings before an interview and after an
interview.” 155 The Code also specifies the length
of time for which material must be retained; for
incarcerated convicts, the material must be kept
until the person is released from custody.156
As a practical matter, the need to save
“ everything”
relevant to the investigation of
Crown Court cases, and of contested magistrates’
court cases, imposes a demanding and potentially
costly standard.157 Courts can dismiss prosecutions
if police failure to retain potentially relevant
the United States that considers training in the duty to
record exculpatory evidence. But see Fisher, Just the Facts,
supra note 17, at 26-27 & n.132 (reviewing training materials
from six police departments in several states that suggest
that police are formally instructed to record “ all relevant
evidence” in their reports, but given a stronger, implicit
message to record only inculpatory evidence).
152. CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 5.1.
153. See id. § 5.4.
154. See id. §§ 5.1-5.4; Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 4345.
155. Interviews with staff at West Mercia Constabulary
Headquarters, Training and Development, in Hindlip, Worcester,
U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999).
156. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 5.8
157. Among other things, conformance with the requirement
could require, over time, the building and maintenance of
costly storage facilities. I heard conflicting accounts as to
whether this was a serious problem for the police.
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material prejudices the defendant’s ability to get
a fair trial. For example, courts have dismissed
cases for “ abuse of process”
because video
recordings from cameras monitoring downtown street
activity were taped over or lost before the trials
of defendants charged with crimes on adjacent
streets.158
e. The Duty to Reveal Information to the Prosecutor
(i) The Legal Framework
After a suspect has been charged, the police must
transmit to the prosecutor a file containing the
evidence in support of the prosecution case.159 At
the same time, they must reveal to the prosecutor
all additional “ unused material”
that may be
This is done in
relevant to the investigation.160
the following manner:
In all Crown Court cases,
and in contested magistrates’ court cases, the
disclosure
officer
must
prepare
a
schedule
describing each item of relevant material retained
Separate schedules are prepared
by the police.161
that
may
be
for
“ sensitive”
materials162
privileged from disclosure, and “ non-sensitive”
materials.163 The scheduled items must be numbered
consecutively and described in sufficient detail
to enable the prosecutor to decide whether she
needs to inspect the material before determining
whether or not it should be disclosed to the

158. See interview with Crown Prosecutor, in Coventry, U.K.
(Apr. 6, 1999).
159. See supra Part I.C.2.
160. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, §§ 7.1-7.5.
Like the prosecutor’s disclosure duties, the police duties are
continuing. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 9; CPIA Code of
Practice, supra note 33, §§ 8.1-8.3.
161. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, §§ 6.6-6.8,
7.1-7.5. The forms and schedules by which the police transmit
mandated information to the CPS are uniform for all of England
and Wales. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text. The
schedules indicate the location of each listed item. See infra
Appendix C (sample forms for sensitive and non-sensitive
material).
162. See Schedule of Sensitive Material (Form MG 6D),
reproduced in Appendix C, infra.
163. See Schedule of Non-Sensitive Unused Material (Form MG
6C), reproduced in Appendix C, infra.
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defense.164 As to items listed in the schedule of
sensitive material, the disclosure officer must
also state the reasons why in the public interest
the material should not be disclosed.165
In addition to providing the prosecutor with
schedules of unused sensitive and non-sensitive
materials, the police are required to give her
copies of particular materials.166 These materials
include:
records of the first description of a
suspect given to police by a potential witness,
information given by the accused providing an
“ explanation for the offence,”
any material
casting doubt on the reliability of a confession
or
witness,
and
other
materials
that
the
investigator believes are subject to primary
disclosure because they might undermine the case
On a special form, the
for the prosecution.167
disclosure officer must alert the prosecutor to
those items that he believes might satisfy the
tests for primary and secondary disclosure, and
give reasons for his beliefs.168 The prosecutor may
also ask the police to submit specified retained
material to her for inspection, in order to decide
whether such material should be disclosed to the
defense.
After reviewing and approving the schedules
prepared by the police, the prosecutor must sign
and
forward
the
schedule
of
non-sensitive
materials to the defense, together with copies of
any materials the prosecutor chooses to provide as
In
order
to
receive
primary disclosure.169
secondary disclosure, the defendant must then

164. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 6.9.
165. See id. § 6.12.
The Code gives examples of material
that might, depending on the circumstances, be too sensitive
to disclose.
Examples range from material relating to
national security or received from foreign sources or
intelligence agencies to material “ given in confidence” or
which reveals “ directly or indirectly, techniques and methods
relied upon by a police officer in the course of a criminal
investigation.” Id.
166. See id. § 7.3.
167. See id.
168. See id. § 7.2.
169. In practice, the defense receives the schedules, in
accordance with the apparent legislative intent, but the
statutory language is not crystal clear. See CPIA, supra note
32, § 4; Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 36.
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submit a defense statement, which the prosecutor
must forward to the police disclosure officer.170
The disclosure officer must then review the
retained material in police files and “ draw the
attention of the prosecutor to any material which
might reasonably be expected to assist the defence
disclosed by the accused; and he must reveal it to
Both
when
the
disclosure
officer
him.” 171
initially sends the schedules of unused material
to the prosecutor, and after he reviews the files
again in light of the defense statement, he must
certify in writing to the prosecutor that “ to the
best of his knowledge and belief, all material
which has been retained and made available to him
has been revealed to the prosecutor.” 172
(ii)Implementation of the Act
Most informants, including every prosecutor I
interviewed, criticized the police for failing to
The police
perform their duties properly.173
responsibilities, which are at the heart of the
disclosure scheme, involve four major tasks:
(1)
describing
scheduled
materials
in
sufficient
detail; (2) providing the prosecutor with copies
of
certain
materials;
(3)
accurately
distinguishing between sensitive and non-sensitive
materials; and (4) identifying material that
should be disclosed to the defense. In practice,
reportedly, the police often fall short in each
task:
police descriptions on the schedules tend
to be general and uninformative; required copies
of
records
such
as
first
descriptions
and
170. See Joint Operational Instructions, supra note 84, §
3.35.
171. CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 8.2.
172. Id. § 9.1.
Police are also required to check whether
certain prosecution witnesses have previous convictions, and
reveal them to the prosecutor. But whether such convictions
should be disclosed is a decision in each case for the
prosecutor, applying the tests for primary and secondary
disclosure. See Joint Operational Instructions, supra note 84,
Annex B (entitled “ Previous convictions and cautions of
prosecution witnesses” ).
173. For critical accounts of the Act in operation, as well
as criticisms of the Act as impracticably “ perfectionist,”
see British Academy of Forensic Sciences, Disclosure Under the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, supra note 31,
passim.
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suspects’ explanations are not provided;174 nonsensitive materials, if favorable to the defense,
are often scheduled as sensitive;175 sensitive
materials
are
not
properly
scheduled;
and
materials that should be identified as subject to
primary or secondary disclosure are not so
identified.
A prosecutor described the following illustrative
case to me.176 A “ serial wife abuser” was charged
with
multiple
counts
of
assault,
false
imprisonment,
and
witness
intimidation,
all
allegedly committed against his wife. Form MG 6C,
the Schedule of Non-Sensitive Unused Material,177
contained only the following entries:
Item
No.
1
2
3
4

Description
Officer’s
PNB
[police
notebook]
Crime File178
Person in Custody Sheet
Fingerprints and Photo

Location
With Officers
-M3 Cell Block
Llyod House

The accompanying file contained no copies of any
of the listed material, nor any indication of what
information was contained in the police notebook
or other scheduled materials.
Form MG 6E, the
Disclosure Officer’s Report to the prosecutor that
must list the scheduled items that appear to
174. See Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 92-93 (noting
that police keep CPS “ in the dark” by failing to disclose
questionnaires completed in house-to-house inquiries, computer
printouts of police communications, full crime reports, full
transcripts of witness and suspect interviews, and other
original materials).
175. In one case, for example, a tape recording of the
defendant’s telephone call requesting an ambulance for the
victim suggested, by the tone of his voice, that he was not
the assailant.
The police listed the tape on the
“ sensitive”
schedule. See interview with Principal Crown
Prosecutor, Casework Services Division, CPS Headquarters, in
London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999).
176. See interview with Crown Prosecutor, in Coventry, U.K.
(Apr. 6, 1999).
177. See this form infra Appendix C, showing information
supplied in a different case.
178. This
refers
to
the
police
file
containing
all
investigative materials in the case.
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undermine the prosecution case or to assist the
defense, as well as copies of materials that are
required to be supplied to the prosecutor in every
case, was left blank. However, on a “ Confidential
Information” form,179 the police recited background
information indicating a long history in which
defendant’s wife would accuse the defendant of
abuse, then retract, claiming that she had started
the fight or making some other excuse. The police
believed that the defendant’s wife was frightened
of the defendant.
This history should have been
included on either the schedule of non-sensitive,
or of sensitive, unused material, but was not. On
receipt of the file, the Crown Prosecutor asked
the police to submit all of the unused material in
the case. When I spoke with her, she was waiting
for the files, which she expected would include
copies of all records pertaining to domestic
violence in the family, including social welfare
and medical records.
Other practitioners confirmed as typical the
pattern illustrated by the above case.
According
to most informants, the police rarely flag unused
material as meeting the test of primary or
secondary disclosure. Thus, the principals of two
large firms of solicitors, who defend many serious
criminal cases, each told me that they had never
received any material in the primary disclosure
stage.180 One of them reported that, when he gives
the prosecution a defense statement, he normally
gets nothing in secondary disclosure unless he
“ pushes.” 181
Because the police fail to describe the scheduled
materials in sufficient detail to allow prosecutors
to decide whether the material merits disclosure,
and do not normally supply copies of the scheduled
materials, the burden remains on the prosecutor to
ask the police for more detailed scheduling of
and/or access to the underlying materials. Whether
the Crown Prosecutor will take this initiative in a
179. Form MG 6, reproduced in Appendix C, infra.
180. See interviews with defense solicitors, in London, U.K.
(Apr. 12, 1999); interviews with defense solicitors, in
Birmingham, U.K. (Apr. 13, 1999).
181. According to this solicitor, he could count instances of
secondary disclosure “ on the fingers of one hand.” Interview
with defense solicitor in Birmingham, U.K (Apr. 13, 1999).
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particular case, or instead, relying on the police
response, will simply sign the form letter stating
that no material subject to primary or secondary
disclosure exists, depends upon the prosecutor’s
conscientiousness and workload,182 as well as the
nature and seriousness of the case.
In many cases the thoroughness of disclosure
review also depends on the skill and persistence of
the
defense
lawyer
in
demanding
access
to
particular
materials,
or
alternatively,
the
prosecutor’s assurance that she has personally
reviewed the unused materials and determined that
they do not satisfy the criteria for disclosure.
Faced with such demands, prosecutors might request
more complete and detailed schedules. In a case in
which HOLMES183 was used, these would consist of
computer-generated
printouts
listing
all
investigative actions, documents, and other data.
Prosecutors might themselves inspect the underlying
documents, or might instruct the police to give the
defense lawyer full access to the police file,
minus any potentially sensitive materials. In some
locales, judges will prevail upon the Crown to give
the
defense
such
access,
even— in
flagrant
disregard of the Act— when the defense has not

182. Interviews with two Crown Prosecutors in the same office
revealed markedly different approaches to their duties under
the Act. One of the prosecutors said that he would never sign
such a disclosure form without requesting and studying all of
the scheduled materials, such as property slips, crime
reports, custody records, command and control logs, and PACE
premises search logs. If the last item lists eight officers
who were present at the search, he will ensure that he has
statements from all eight.
If any are missing, he will ask
for statements to be taken from the rest, and read those. The
other prosecutor said that he relies entirely upon his (paralegal) case worker to review the material, and will sign the
disclosure form unless the worker brings something to his
attention indicating he should not. See interview with Senior
and Subordinate Crown Prosecutors, in Abingdon, U.K. (Apr. 13,
1999).
All of my informants agreed that some prosecutors
routinely sign off on disclosure forms prepared by the police.
In a few locations chief prosecutors have announced a policy
of refusing to accept police schedules that are insufficiently
detailed. See interview with Principal Crown Prosecutor,
Casework Services Division, CPS Headquarters, in London, U.K.
(Apr. 14, 1999).
183. See infra Appendix A, notes 361-65 and accompanying
text.
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supplied a defense statement.184 The willingness of
some prosecutors and judges to allow the defense
direct access to the unused materials despite the
requirements imposed by the new law reflects a
belief that the prosecutor lacks the time, and the
police lack the ability and/or the motivation, to
properly identify exculpatory material.
D. Conclusion
Despite
the
controversies
surrounding
the
adoption and implementation of the 1996 Act, there
seems to be general agreement on three important
propositions:
first, that in contested cases the
police should be required to record, retain, and
reveal to the prosecutor all of the relevant
material gathered in the investigation; second,
that formal processes are needed to structure the
communications between police investigators and
the prosecutor, including a strong prosecutorial
role in police training; and third, that the
defense should have access at least to schedules
of the non-sensitive relevant material.
Despite
the failure of English police in practice to
provide
sufficiently
detailed
and
complete
schedules and copies of unused materials in the
first instance, the schedules function, at least
in routine, serious,185 contested cases, to alert
both the prosecution and the defense to the
184. This appears to occur commonly in London, for example,
at the hands of judges who may be ignorant of, or indifferent
to, the Act’s requirements. See interview with defense
solicitor, in London, U.K. (Apr. 12, 1999).
185. Although roughly the same police and prosecution
responsibilities regarding exculpatory evidence apply to
contested summary and Crown Court proceedings, important
implementation
differences
exist
as
between
summary
prosecutions and Crown Court proceedings. According to all of
my informants, the Act is not generally followed in cases
litigated in the magistrates’ court: the police often do not
submit schedules of unused material, and prosecutors are more
likely to sign off on police schedules without pressing the
police for more detailed descriptions or reviewing the listed
material to see whether it is disclosable. Also, defendants
in magistrates’ court proceedings rarely submit defense
statements, and therefore rarely ask the court to order
disclosure under section 8 of the Act. See interview with
Crown Prosecutor, in Coventry, U.K. (Apr. 6, 1999); interview
with two defense solicitors, in Birmingham, U.K. (Apr. 13,
1999 and Apr. 21, 1999 respectively).
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existence and location of basic materials known to
the police. It then falls to the defense lawyer,
with the aid of the court if necessary,186 to press
the prosecutor to review the materials or to allow
the defense to do so.
Thus the English system
establishes
a
framework
to
give
prosecutors
regular access to a comprehensive record of the
police investigation.
This is precisely the sort
of access that the U.S. Supreme Court in Kyles
assumed was available to prosecutors in this
country.187
II.
LESSONS OF THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES: THE PROSECUTOR’S ETHICAL DUTY TO SEEK EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE KNOWN TO THE POLICE
Although many features of the English experience
should be of interest to Americans,188 I shall
concentrate on two that I find most instructive as
they might relate to implementation of the
prosecutor’s Brady duties:
government regulation
186. This can be accomplished informally, or by means of a
formal application under Section 8 of the Act. See CPIA, supra
note 32, § 8.
187. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
188. The English have adopted several safeguards that might
be
worth
emulating,
such
as
the
use
of
independent
“ identification officers,”
see infra notes 351-55 and
accompanying text, the requirement that interrogations be
recorded, see supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text, and
the Criminal Case Review Commission, see supra note 70. These
reforms resulted from “ post-mortem” inquiries, established
in response to notorious miscarriages of justice.
See also
Fred Kaufman, Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul
Morin (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, Canada, 1998), available
in
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.
on.ca/html/MORIN/morin.htm> (visited Mar. 2, 2000) (official
commission of inquiry into wrongful murder conviction and
incarceration of young man later cleared by DNA evidence).
The English experience also shows that reform commissions can
operate as double-edged swords:
an inquiry established in
response to public concern over conviction of the factually
innocent may be “ captured”
by conservatives, producing
reforms designed to facilitate conviction of the factually
guilty. Cf. Craig M. Bradley, The Failure of the Criminal
Procedure Revolution: A Response, 47 J. Legal Educ. 129, 133
(1997) (acknowledging that national codification of criminal
procedure regulations in the United States would risk
“ letting political considerations unacceptably diminish the
rights of criminal suspects,”
but still preferring the
relative clarity of comprehensive procedural codes to the
confusion and inconsistency of constantly shifting case law).

FISHER BP

2000]

04/07/00 11:46 AM

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN POLICE HANDS

149

of police record-keeping, and measures ensuring
the prosecutor’s access to investigative police
files. As to the former, even before enactment of
the CPIA in 1996, the English imposed a set of
elaborate
record-keeping
requirements
on
the
Requirements meant to enhance the
police.189
objectivity
and
reliability
of
investigative
records, such as those governing police notebooks,
the
role
of
PACE
custody
officers
and
identification officers, and policy books, serve
to
increase
the
transparency
of
police
investigation to external review.190 Other devices,
such as the use of HOLMES to investigate selected
major crimes, were designed to achieve efficient
crime detection, but have the same incidental
effect.
The 1996 Act gave legislative force to
the previously established duty of police to
record and retain relevant investigative material.
Regarding prosecutorial access to police files,
PACE, the CPIA, and the Practice Codes established
under both statutes give prosecutors detailed
guidance regarding the specific items that they
must obtain from investigators before trial, and
These
requirements
track
in
what
form.191
corresponding police duties to record and reveal
such items to prosecutors.
Thus,
the
English
have
established
a
comprehensive regulatory framework for police
record-keeping and revelation of case information
to the prosecutor.
They have also devoted
significant resources to enforcing this regime,
including
such
measures
as
promulgation
of
appropriate forms and schedules, training of
police and prosecutors,192 and the designation of
189. These requirements were imposed under PACE and the
Guinness Advice. See supra notes 51-59, 64-68 and accompanying
text; infra Appendix A.
190. While scholars disagree on the effectiveness of the PACE
record-keeping reforms, most agree that they have at least
partially achieved their aim. See supra notes 64-66 and
accompanying
text.
But
some
argue
that
the
PACE
“ safeguards”
simply mask and legitimate the exercise of
broad police discretion. See Bridges & Bunyon, supra note 66,
at 91-94; McConville et al., supra note 31, at 118-23.
191. See supra notes 69-101 and accompanying text.
192. Initial training of police and prosecutors, for which
substantial written materials were prepared, was carried out
before the CPIA was implemented. See interview with Principal
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particular police personnel to perform recordkeeping
duties
as
custody
officers,193
194
identification
officers,
and
disclosure
officers.195
Like
England,
the
United
States
requires
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence known
However, the two countries take
to the police.196
radically different approaches to implementing the
prosecutor’s duty.
In the United States, the
absence of legislative or other regulation of
police
record-keeping
and
transmission
of
information to prosecutors is starkly apparent.
American legislatures have traditionally taken a
“ hands-off” approach to the regulation of police
Furthermore,
it
appears
that
practices.197
Americans have not committed significant resources
to the task of training police to record and
reveal
exculpatory
evidence
to
prosecutors.
Crown
Prosecutor,
Casework
Services
Division,
CPS
Headquarters, in London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999).
193. See infra Appendix A, notes 339-45 and accompanying
text.
194. See infra Appendix A, notes 350-52 and accompanying
text.
195. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. In the United
States this is constitutionally required by Kyles, see supra
notes 1-4 and accompanying text; see also U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 9A Department of Justice Manual, Criminal Div., § 990.210, at 9-1943.3 (1997) (discussing prosecutor’s duty,
under case law, to search for Brady information in the files
of “ aligned agencies,”
defined as agencies “ actively
involved in the investigation or the prosecution of a
particular case” ); Fredman, supra note 5, at 348 (“ [A]ll
information within a particular prosecutor’s office falls
within the ambit of Brady.” ); Hochman, supra note 5, at 167779 (discussing prosecutor’s duty to gather exculpatory
evidence held by persons outside the prosecutor’s office); Lis
Wiehl, Keeping Files on the File Keepers:
When Prosecutors
are Forced to Turn Over the Personnel Files of Federal Agents
to Defense Lawyers, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 73, 75-77 (1997)
(discussing duty of prosecutors to search personnel files of
federal agents who will testify for impeachment material).
197. The Warren Court decisions protecting the rights of
criminal defendants vis-a-vis the police and the courts can be
seen as filling a vacuum created by legislative abstention.
But see Bradley, supra note 188, at 129-30 (arguing that
Congress has power to, and should, enact a national code of
criminal procedure governing the conduct of all federal and
state law enforcement agents).
Professor Bradley’s proposal
has not been warmly received by scholarly commentators. See
id. at 130-31 (citing negative reviews of his proposed
reform).
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Instead, we have relied on self-regulation by law
enforcement
agencies
and
the
efforts
of
prosecutors. For reasons discussed elsewhere,198 I
suspect that neither resort has been, nor promises
effective
in
ensuring
regular
to
be,199
prosecutorial access to exculpatory evidence known
to the police.
Yet, without such access,
prosecutors
cannot
meet
their
constitutional
obligations to the defendant.
Congress could address this problem by adopting
an English-style legislative remedy, binding on
state and local prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies.
As compared to reforming the rules of
professional
responsibility,
legislation
would
have
advantages
of
greater
uniformity,
comprehensiveness, and enforceability.
Congress
198. See generally Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at
26-31 (offering several justifications for self-regulation).
199. Barring increased external pressures, it is doubtful
that police agencies will have incentive to overhaul their own
practices.
However, the predictable increased use of
computer-assisted record keeping should at least reduce the
cost-disincentives
of
more
comprehensive
recording
and
transmission of information from police to prosecutors. See,
e.g.,
James
W.
Stevens,
Computer
Technology,
in
The
Encyclopedia of Police Science 73-75 (William G. Bailey ed.,
1989) (predicting expanded use of “ direct-field entry
reporting systems for completing police reports and for
speeding information transfer into the police communications
process” ); Seanna Browder, Now, The Cops are Strapping on
Computers, Bus. Wk., July 13, 1998, at 7, 7, available in 1998
WL 8133191 (reporting field-testing in three cities of
lightweight
wearable
computers
for
use
in
police
investigation; computers are equipped with digital cameras and
laser range finders for recording crime-scene data); Seaskate,
Inc., The Evolution and Development of Police Technology:
A
Technical Report Prepared for the National Committee on
Criminal Justice Technology 4 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, 1998),
available in <http:www.NLECTC.org> (quoting a police chief as
saying, “ My vision is that when an officer comes through the
academy, we give him his weapon, we give him his radio, and we
give him his laptop computer.” ).
Presumably, large-scale investigations in the United States,
such as the World Trade Center and Oklahoma Bombing cases, are
conducted using computerized programs similar to the English
HOLMES system. See infra Appendix A, notes 356-66 and
accompanying text; see also Seaskate, Inc., supra, at 63
(describing use of “ records management systems” that allow
information to be fed into a “ relational database,” which
can be “ manipulated and retrieved based on the criteria of
the detective” ). I am not familiar with the extent of such
techniques in this country, nor with the treatment of such
databases in criminal discovery.
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would have the power to adopt such legislation,
based upon its power to enforce the prosecutor’s
Due Process duty under Brady.
Alternatively,
Congress could use incentives, such as federal
funding for local law enforcement, to encourage
However,
the states to adopt such legislation.200
despite the rising number of well publicized
miscarriages of justice,201 neither Congress nor
state legislatures are likely to impose Englishstyle record-keeping practices on state and local
law enforcement agencies.
As Donald Dripps has
persuasively argued, no sufficiently powerful
constituency exists to persuade legislators to
invest scarce political and economic resources in
such a cause.202
It is also unlikely that courts will take up the
slack. Like the Supreme Court in Kyles,203 courts
generally recognize the prosecutor’s dependence
upon law enforcement to comply with Brady.
Accordingly, they have been willing to hold law
enforcement officers liable under the Federal
Civil Rights Act for suppressing exculpatory
But courts have been reluctant to
evidence.204
grant
equitable
relief
compelling
police
to
investigate,
record,
and
reveal
exculpatory

200. I thank Professor Kevin McMunigal for his contributions
to my thinking on these points.
201. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Chicago Trib.,
Nov. 14, 16-18, 1999 (five-part series on faulty justice in
Illinois capital cases from 1977 to 1999); Ken Armstrong &
Maurice Possley, Chicago Trib., Jan. 8-12, 1999 (five-part
series on prosecutorial misconduct and miscarriages of justice
in the United States); Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, Atlantic
Monthly, Nov. 1999, at 66, 66 (reporting on “ horrifyingly
likely” prospect that innocent people will be executed in
America); Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Case Takes on
Momentum of Its Own, L.A. Times, Dec. 31, 1999, at A1
(describing how over a dozen police officers have been
suspended in scandal involving, inter alia, framing innocent
suspects); Bill Moushey, Win at all Costs:
Government
Misconduct in the Name of Expedient Justice, Pitt. PostGazette, Nov. 22, 24 and 29, 1997, and Dec. 1, 6, 7, 8 and 13,
1998 (series on abuses by federal prosecutors).
202. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four,
and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures
Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 Syracuse L.
Rev. 1079, 1089-92 (1993).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 265-272.
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Also, court rules
evidence to prosecutors.205
governing pretrial discovery reflect judicial
reluctance to prescribe police record-keeping
procedures:
the
rules
commonly
require
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence,206 but
205. This was demonstrated in Palmer v. City of Chicago, 562
F. Supp. 1067, 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 755 F.2d 560 (7th
Cir. 1985), a class action suit seeking, inter alia, an order
prohibiting the Chicago Police Department from keeping
clandestine “ street files” separate from the investigative
files that the Department turned over to the State’s
Attorney’s Office. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17,
at 36-38, 42-44 (discussing the case in greater depth). The
district court granted the plaintiffs sweeping relief,
ordering the police department to:
(1) conduct impartial
investigations, take complete notes, and pursue exculpatory
evidence; (2) preserve all handwritten and other notes as well
as other investigative documents in a single file with a
checklist of the contents; (3) respond to subpoenas and
discovery motions by transmitting copies of the checklist to
the prosecutor; and (4) train its detectives in the new
procedures. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated
almost all of the lower court’s order, including those parts
ordering police and prosecutors to “ restructure their
internal procedures for the recording, maintaining and
production of investigative files.” Palmer, 755 F.2d at 576.
According to the circuit court, Supreme Court precedents
(Brady and Younger) defining the government’s due process
obligation to gather and preserve potentially exculpatory
evidence limited the courts’ power to prescribe more
comprehensive prophylactic procedures. See id. at 574-77.
206. Writings about Brady issues have tended to focus on the
prosecutor’s constitutional and ethical duties, while paying
little attention to her corollary duties under state discovery
rules.
Yet, a review of state pretrial discovery rules and
statutes reveals that 43 jurisdictions explicitly require the
prosecutor
to
disclose
exculpatory
evidence
(variously
defined) to the defense before trial. See Ala. R. Crim. P.
16.1(a) (within fourteen days of defendant’s request); Alaska
R. Crim. P. 16 (upon defendant’s motion); Ariz. R. Crim. P.
15.1(a) (within ten days from arraignment); Ark. R. Crim. P.
17.1 (upon timely request); Cal. R. Glenn Super. Ct. 12.7
(within 14 days from information); Colo. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)
(within 20 days of first appearance); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
54-86a(a) (West 1994) (upon defendant’s motion); Del. R. Com.
Pl. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A) (upon defendant’s request);
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1) (within 15 days of serving notice
of discovery); Haw. R. Penal P. 16(e)(1) (within in 10 days
from
arraignment);
Idaho
Ct.
R.
16(a)
(as
soon
as
practicable); Ill. S. Ct. R. 412(a) (as soon as practical
after defendant’s motion); Ind. Marion Super. Ct. Crim. R.
7(1)(a) (20 days from initial hearing); Iowa Code Ann. §
813.2, Rule 13 (West 1999) (pretrial request by defendant);
Ky. R. Jefferson Cir. Ct. 603(A) (within 10 days before
pretrial conference); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 718 (West
1981) (pretrial); Me. R. Crim. P. 16 (within 10 days from
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stop short of requiring the police to record such
evidence and reveal it to the prosecutor. This is
true even of very expansive disclosure schemes,
such as the one recently adopted in local rules by
the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts.207
The Massachusetts rules impose far-reaching,
detailed
duties
on
prosecutors
to
disclose
potentially
exculpatory
information
to
the
Reflecting the Kyles holding that
defense.208
arraignment on certain offenses); Md. R. Crim. Causes 4-263(b)
(defendant’s request); Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(a)(1) (pretrial
motion); Mich. Ct. R. 6.201(F) (within seven days of
defendant’s request); Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01 (at defendant’s
request before omnibus hearing); Mo. R. Crim. P. 25.03(B)
(written request by defendant); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-15-322(1)
(1998) (defendant’s request); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1912 (1995)
(same); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 174.235(1) (1997) (same); N.H.
Super. Ct. R. 98 (within 30 days from a not-guilty plea); N.M.
R. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 5-501(A) (within ten days from
arraignment); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 240.20(1) (McKinney 1993)
(upon defendant’s demand); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a) (1973)
(defendant’s motion); N.D. R. Crim. P. 16 (defendant’s written
request); Ohio R. Crim. P. 16(A) (defendant’s request); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2002(A)(1) (West 1994) (same); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 135.815 (1990) (same); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(A) (same);
R.I. Sup. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (same); S.C. R. Crim. P.
5(a)(1)(A) (same); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-13-1 (Michie 1978)
(defendant’s written request); Tex. Crim. P. Code Ann. §
39.14(a) (West 2000) (defendant’s motion showing good cause);
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a) (upon request, but as soon as practical
following the filing of charges and before the defendant is
required to plead); Vt. R. Crim. P. 16(1) (as soon as
possible, after a plea of not guilty); Wash. St. Super. Ct.
Crim. R. 4.7(1) (no later than the omnibus hearing); W. Va. R.
Crim. P. 16(a) (defendant’s request); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
971.23(1) (West 1998) (within a reasonable time before trial).
207. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.1-116.9
(adopted Sept. 8, 1998, effective Dec. 1, 1998); see Report of
the Judicial Members of the Committee Established to Review
and Recommend Revisions of the Local Rules of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Concerning Criminal Cases (1998) [hereinafter Mass. Rules
Committee Report].
The full texts of the adopted rules and
the
report
are
accessible
at
<http://www.bostonbar.org/dd/crimrules/report.htm>
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2000). See Will Revolutionary Discovery Shot
be Heard ‘Round the World?, 12 BNA Crim. Prac. Rep. 483, 43-44
(1998); infra text accompanying notes 208-213.
208. Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
address the prosecutor’s Brady duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defendant before trial, some federal district
courts outside of Massachusetts also regulate such disclosure
in local rules. See, e.g., D.N.H. Local R. 16.1(c); D.N.M.
Local Crim. R. 16.1; N.D.N.Y. R. 16.1(c); E.D.N.C. Local R.

FISHER BP

2000]

04/07/00 11:46 AM

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN POLICE HANDS

155

prosecutors are responsible for disclosing Brady
material known to law enforcement agents “ acting
on the government’s behalf in the case,” 209 the
Local Rules require the prosecutor to inform
“ all . . .
law
enforcement
agencies
formally
participating in the criminal investigation . . .
of the discovery obligations set forth [in the
Rules] and obtain any information subject to
disclosure from each such agency.” 210 Although the
Rules expressly require criminal investigators to
preserve relevant materials and documents made or
possessed by them,211 they do not expressly require
them to assist prosecutors in implementing Brady
by recording212 or revealing these items to the
Prac. P. 43.01; D. Vt. Local R. P. 16.1(a); N.D. W. Va. Local
R. 4.08.
209. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
210. D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.8.
Rule
116.1(A)(1) subjects to automatic discovery “ all discoverable
material and information in the possession, custody, or
control of the government . . . the existence of which is
known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known,
to the [prosecutor] . . . .” Id.
211. Local Rule 116.9(A) provides:
All
contemporaneous
notes,
memoranda,
statements,
reports, surveillance logs, tape recordings, and other
documents memorializing matters relevant to the charges
contained in the indictment made by or in the custody
of any law enforcement officer whose agency at the time
was
formally
participating
in
an
investigation
intended, in whole or in part, to result in a federal
indictment shall be preserved until the entry of
judgment unless otherwise ordered by Court.
Id. Rule 116.9(A). The Rule does not require the preservation
of rough drafts of reports after a subsequent draft of a final
report is prepared; however, the rough contemporaneous notes
upon which the drafts were based must be retained. See id.
Rule 116.9(A)-(B).
212. The Rules indirectly require that some information known
to non-prosecutor government officials be recorded in tangible
form.
For example, the government must produce “ a
statement” whether promises of rewards or inducement have
been
given
to
government
witnesses,
see
id.
Rule
116.2(B)(1)(c), and a “ written description”
of criminal
cases pending against government witnesses, see id. Rule
116.2(B)(1)(e), and of the failure of percipient witnesses to
make a positive identification of the defendant in an
identification procedure, see id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(f).
In
addition,
other
rules,
which
require
production
of
“ exculpatory information,” probably intend that disclosure
take documentary form.
This would implicitly require either
the investigators or the prosecutor to reduce to writing
otherwise non-recorded exculpatory information that must be
disclosed, such as information that “ tends to cast doubt on
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prosecutor.
This failure, which is typical of
court rules and standards, should probably be
understood as expressing judicial reluctance to
intrude on the executive domain, rather than a
doubt that courts have power to impose such duties
on the police.213
Whether
viewed
as
regrettable
default
or
principled abstention, the consequence of judicial
(combined with legislative) inaction is plain:
prosecutors have the sole responsibility for
obtaining access to Brady material held by law
enforcement agents.
In light of the severe
practical limits on a prosecutor’s ability to
control law enforcement agencies, this might be
viewed as unrealistic.
On the other hand, as an
executive agent sharing crime control goals and
responsibilities with law enforcement agencies,
the prosecutor is better positioned to elicit
their cooperation than either defense counsel or
the court. If, because of legislative abstention,
prosecutors’ efforts prove unavailing, they are
better situated than any other constituency to
lobby the legislature to intervene.214
the credibility or accuracy of any witness,”
id. Rule
116.2(B)(2)(a), or inconsistent oral statements. See id. Rule
116.2(B)(2)(b).
213. Courts have power to compel production of evidence by
persons who are not parties, their attorneys, or witnesses in
the case. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(d) (allowing courts to issue orders and injunctions binding
“ parties, . . . their . . . agents, . . . employees . . .
and . . . those persons in active concert or participation
with them who receive actual notice of the order” ).
Courts
are also willing to order police to preserve relevant evidence
in their possession. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim.
Cases 116.9(A); see also Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d
560, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding district court order to
police to preserve “ street files” for the plaintiff subclass composed of convicted felons); United States v. Feola,
651 F. Supp. 1068, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ordering preservation
of “ all tape recordings or handwritten or typed notes of
interviews or communications made in connection with this
case” by all state and federal law enforcement personnel).
Although an order to preserve existing evidence is less
intrusive and less costly to implement than one requiring
affirmative actions, such as recording or transmitting
evidence, the difference seems to be one of degree rather than
one of kind.
214. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 223, 281-82 (1993)
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What steps might be taken to bring prosecutorial
practice into line with the Supreme Court’s
expectations announced in Kyles?
The foregoing
account of the English system suggests changes in
our ethical rules and standards to address this
situation.
A. The Place of Ethical Norms in Regulating the
Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
The American prosecutor’s duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence is expressed in a tangled web
of regulation, consisting of overlapping layers of
constitutional and sub-constitutional norms.215 The
former are essentially defined by Brady’s due
process jurisprudence, which aspires to national
uniformity.216 The latter, which vary by state and,
sometimes, by county or district within the same
state, are embodied in rules of pretrial discovery
and professional responsibility.
The ethical
norms include not only disciplinary rules, but
also— in standards and commentaries— expressions
of general principles and guides to particular
best practices.217
The disclosure requirements imposed by these
various sources can differ in scope and timing.
For example, a prosecutor’s failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence in a particular case might
satisfy her obligations under the Due Process
Clause, yet violate her duty under broader ethics
The difference
provisions and discovery rules.218
(discussing political influence of prosecutor organizations).
215. See, e.g, Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors:
Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St.
Thomas L. Rev. 69, 72 (1995) (describing how federal
prosecutors are bound by federal rules and statutes, the Due
Process Clause, codes of professional responsibility, rules
promulgated on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, and internal
guidelines adopted by the Department of Justice).
216. Disclosure duties in some states are also governed by
more protective state constitutional provisions. See, e.g.,
Bennett L. Gershman, State Constitutionalization of Criminal
Procedure and the Prosecutor’s Disclosure Obligations, 18
Westchester B.J. 101, 107-09 (1991) (describing the New York
Court of Appeals’s reliance on a more protective state
constitution).
217. See generally Zacharias, supra note 214 (discussing the
modern trend of specificity in the regulation of lawyers).
218. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding
that Brady “ requires less of the prosecution than the ABA
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derives from the fact that Brady serves a limited
purpose of guaranteeing a fair trial, and so
requires disclosure only of “ material” evidence,
defined in terms of its likely effect on the trial
However, under ethics provisions and
outcome.219
rules of pretrial discovery in some jurisdictions,
even non-material evidence must be disclosed if it
“ tends
to
negate
[defendant’s]
guilt”
or
Also,
“ mitigate the degree of the offense.” 220
Standards for Criminal Justice, which call generally for
prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to exculpate
or mitigate” ); McMunigal, supra note 22, at 1025 n.206
(noting that Model Code DR 7-103(B) and Model Rule 3.8(d) are
“ more expansive than the original formulation of the Brady
rule, since neither contains a ‘materiality’ limitation or a
requirement that the material be requested by the defense” ).
219. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)
(defining “ material” evidence retrospectively as existing
“ only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different” ).
This outcomedeterminative standard, drawn from Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), is especially difficult to apply before
trial, when the prosecutor will not know what evidence will be
presented. For a careful discussion of this aspect of Bagley,
see McMunigal, supra note 22, at 1008-11.
At least one
federal district court has proposed a broader prospective test
of “ materiality.” See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
220. This language comes from the Model Code’s DR 7-103(B)
and EC 7-13. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR
7-103(B), EC 7-13 (1983).
Later ABA codes and standards
contain similar language. See Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.8(d) (1998); Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.11(a) (3d ed.
1992) (reproduced infra appendix B); Standards for Criminal
Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 11-2.1(a)(viii)
(3d ed. 1996). For an analysis of the evolving language used
in the successive ABA ethical rules to define the prosecutor’s
disclosure duty, and of the general ethical prohibitions that
might apply to suppression of exculpatory evidence, see
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors
for Brady Violations:
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 693,
709-14 (1987); see also Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors
to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev.
833,
879-82
(1997)
(tracing
the
history
of
the
ABA
professional responsibility rules on exculpatory evidence to
Canon 5 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics originally
adopted in 1908).
Pretrial discovery rules in 17 states also incorporate the
“ tends to negate” standard. See Alaska R. Crim. P. 16(b)(3);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(a)(7); Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.1(d); Colo.
R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A)(i); Haw.
R. Penal P. 16(b)(1)(vii); Idaho Crim. R. 16(a); Ill. S. Ct.
R. 412(c); Ind. Marion Super. Ct. Rule 7(2)(b); Ky. R.

FISHER BP

2000]

04/07/00 11:46 AM

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN POLICE HANDS

159

pretrial discovery rules might require earlier,
and broader, disclosure of exculpatory evidence
than either constitutional221 or ethical norms
require.
Whereas the latter two sets of norms
protect interests in a fair and accurate process,
discovery rules serve the courts’ additional
interest in efficient case processing and the
avoidance of delay.
Given the complexity resulting from multiple,
conflicting sources of law, ethical rules should
accurately inform prosecutors of their disclosure
duties.
After Kyles, however, the relevant ABA
rules and standards express these duties in
misleadingly narrow language. They fail to inform
prosecutors of their duty to learn of and disclose
exculpatory evidence known to law enforcement
agents.
Also, they offer no guidance as to the
Jefferson Cir. Ct. 603(f); Md. Rule 4-263(a)(1); Minn. R.
Crim. P. 9.01; Mo. R. Crim. P. 25.03(A)(9); Mont. Code Ann. §
46-15-322(1)(e) (1999); Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(4); Vt. R.
Crim. P. 16(b)(2); Wash. St. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 4.7(a)(3).
221. See supra notes 207-19 and accompanying text. In United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Supreme Court
rejected the claim that Brady created a broad constitutional
right to pretrial discovery. See id. at 675 n.7. Rather, the
Court regarded Brady as a “ trial right,” satisfied so long
as disclosure is made in time for effective defense use at
that stage. See id. at 678.
Accordingly, most courts have
been reluctant to enforce Brady’s constitutional mandate as
part of pretrial discovery. See Charles H. Whitebread &
Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure 598 (1993); Wayne. R.
LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.5(e)
(1985).
The timing of Brady disclosure is especially
problematic when Brady material is protected from early
disclosure by the Jencks Act. Compare United States v.
Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780, 791-94 (E.D. Va. 1997) (discussing
split in federal circuits, and choosing case-by-case balancing
test over competing tests under which either Brady or Jencks
trumps the other), with United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d
1275, 1285-86 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding mid-trial disclosure
adequate to protect defendant’s Brady right). But see United
States v. Snell, 899 F. Supp. 17, 21 n.9 (D. Mass. 1995)
(criticizing Presser).
The conception of Brady as a trial right has led to
disagreement about whether Brady material must be disclosed
prior to the entry of a guilty plea. See Erica G. Franklin,
Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea
Process: A Debate on the Merits of “ Discovery” Waivers, 51
Stan. L. Rev. 567, 573 & n.43 (1999) (noting that most, but
not all, lower courts require disclosure of Brady material
before entry of plea and citing cases); McMunigal, supra note
22, at 958, 1019 (arguing that Brady’s “ due process”
requirement also applies in pre- and post-trial stages).
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appropriate steps prosecutors might take to comply
with that duty.
B. Recognizing an Ethical Duty to Learn of
Exculpatory Evidence Known to the Police
The Supreme Court held in Kyles that prosecutors
have a constitutional duty to disclose not only
“ material” exculpatory evidence known to them,
but also evidence known to “ others acting on the
government’s behalf in the case, including the
police.” 222 In addition, as Kyles recognized, the
latter duty necessarily implies a third duty: to
learn of “ any favorable evidence known to . . .
Of these three duties, only the
the police.” 223
first is currently expressed as an ethical duty.
ABA Model Rule 3.8(d), the sole disciplinary rule
addressed to the Brady obligation, simply requires
disclosure of exculpatory evidence or information
The ABA Standards
“ known to the prosecutor.” 224
for the Prosecution Function state a similarly
narrow approach by forbidding only “ intentional”
Thus, neither the Model
failure to disclose.225
Rule nor the Standard alerts prosecutors to their
additional obligations to learn of and disclose
exculpatory evidence known to other members of the
prosecution
team,
including
law
enforcement
agents.
One must look to the ABA Discovery
Standards for an expression of the prosecutor’s
duty
to
disclose
material
possessed
by
investigators,226 and to make “ reasonable efforts”
222. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
223. Id.
224. Rule 3.8 states in relevant part that:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
. . . .
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates
the offense, and, in connection with sentencing,
disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all
unprivileged
mitigating
information
known
to
the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of
this responsibility by a protective order of the
tribunal . . . .
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8.
225. Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal
Justice Standard 3-3.11 (reproduced infra Appendix B).
226. See Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial
by Jury Standard 11-4.3(a) (3d ed. 1996). Drawn from former
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to ensure that investigators provide relevant
material and information to prosecutors.227 But the
Discovery Standards do not purport to define the
prosecutor’s ethical responsibilities, and have no
impact except in jurisdictions that have modeled
their discovery rules after them.228 Even in those
jurisdictions, prosecutors are likely to look for
ABA Discovery Standard 11-2.1(d) (2d ed. 1980), Standard 114.3(a) extends the disclosure obligations of both prosecutors
and defense attorneys to “ material and information in the
possession or control of members of the attorney’s staff and
of any others who either regularly report to or, with
reference to the particular case, have reported to the
attorney’s office.”
Id.
In conjunction with Discovery
Standard 11-2.1(a)(viii), it applies to exculpatory evidence
within the prosecutor’s possession or control. See id.
227. ABA Discovery Standard 11-4.3, entitled “ Obligation to
obtain discoverable material,” states: “ (b) The prosecutor
should make reasonable efforts to ensure that material and
information relevant to the defendant and the offense charged
is provided by investigative personnel to the prosecutor’s
office.” Id. Standard 11-4.3(b). Standard 11-4.3(b) replaced
former Discovery Standard 11-2.2(c) (1986), which required
prosecutors to “ ensure that a flow of information is
maintained between the various investigative personnel and the
prosecutor’s
office
sufficient
to
place
within
the
prosecutor’s
possession
or
control
all
material
and
information relevant to the accused and the offense charged.”
228. Several states have adopted the language of Standard 114.3(a) in discovery rules. See, e.g., Alaska R. Crim. P. 16
(any others who have participated in the investigation or
evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or with
reference to the particular case have reported to the
prosecuting attorney’s office); Colo. R. Crim. P. Rule
16(a)(3) (same); Idaho Crim. R. 16(a) (same); Md. Rule 4262(c) (same); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-15-322(4) (1999) (any
others who have participated in the investigation or
evaluation of the case).
Some state court rules word the
requirement slightly differently. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Crim. P.
15.1(d) (material and information in the possession or control
of members of the prosecutor’s staff and of any other persons
who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of
the case and who are under the prosecutor’s control). Other
states use more general language. See, e.g., Ind. Marion
Super. Ct. R. 7(2)(a) (“ The State shall disclose the
following
material and information within its possession or
control: . . . .” ). Virginia expressly limits the obligation
to certain information known by the prosecutor to be “ within
the possession, custody, or control of the Commonwealth.” Va.
R. Sup. Ct. 3A:11(b)(2); see also Ky. R. Jefferson Cir. Ct.
603(B) (similar).
A few states have incorporated the language of former
Standard 11-2.2(c) into their court rules. See, e.g., Colo. R.
Crim. P. 16(b)(4); Ill. S. Ct. R. 412(f); see also Ark. R.
Crim. P. 17.1 (commentary); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(d)
(commentary); Vt. R. Crim. P. 16 (Reporter’s Notes).

FISHER BP

162

04/07/00 11:46 AM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

ethical training and guidance to the Rules and
Standards
directly
addressing
prosecutorial
ethics, rather than to the Discovery Standards.
The ABA should consider amending Model Rule 3.8,
and Prosecution Function Standards 3-2.7 and 33.11,
to
specify
the
prosecutor’s
ethical
obligation to learn of exculpatory evidence known
to law enforcement investigators.
The Rules
should also guide prosecutors on how to implement
This could be done by
this responsibility.229
specifying in greater detail the prosecutor’s duty
to
familiarize
herself
with
existing
police
record-keeping
practices,
to
promote
uniform
record-keeping and reporting by investigative
agencies within her jurisdiction, and to train
police in the importance of recording specific
types of potentially exculpatory evidence, and
revealing it to her office.
These changes could
be accomplished by adding the following subparagraphs to Model Rule 3.8, and to Prosecution
Function Standards 3-2.7 and 3-3.11:230
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule
3.8.
Prosecutor

Special

Responsibilities

of

a

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
. . . .
[Proposed] (c-1)
make reasonable efforts to
ensure
that
investigators,
law
enforcement
personnel, employees or other persons assisting
or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal
case reveal to the prosecutor’s office all
material and information that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense or
sentence.
STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION
3-2.7. Relations with Police.
. . . .
229. On the need to provide “ affirmative ethical guidance”
to prosecutors, in addition to prohibiting misconduct, see
Little, supra note 19, at 742-44.
230. For the full text of these provisions see infra Appendix
B.
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[Proposed] (c)
A prosecutor should become
familiar
with existing law enforcement recordkeeping
practices
in
the
prosecutor’s
jurisdiction.
[Proposed] (d) The prosecutor should encourage
and assist law enforcement agencies to adopt a
uniform police report that will contain all
information
necessary
for
a
successful
prosecution
and
for
compliance
with
the
prosecutor’s
duty
to
disclose
favorable
information to the defense.
3-3.11.

Disclosure of Evidence by the Prosecutor

[Proposed] (a-1)
A prosecutor should make
reasonable efforts to ensure that all material
and information which tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or
which would tend to reduce the punishment of the
accused is provided by investigative personnel to
the prosecutor’s office.

C. Discussion
1. Justification for the Proposed Amendments
The proposed amendments address the prosecutor’s
duty to bridge the gap between what she knows and
what she must know in order to comply with Kyles.
The collective impact of several factors makes it
important to express this duty as an ethical
responsibility.
These factors include:
(1) the
de
facto
monopoly
enjoyed
by
police
and
prosecutors over early access to the raw “ facts”
of the case, including potentially exculpatory
facts, and the corresponding disadvantage to the
defense; (2) the absence of strong incentives for
police to record and reveal exculpatory evidence
to prosecutors,231 or for prosecutors to ensure that
231. Kevin McMunigal has described the conflicting incentives
affecting police decisions to conceal or reveal exculpatory
evidence to the prosecutor. See McMunigal, supra note 22, at
1003-04.
He points out that although a rule mandating
prosecutorial disclosure to the defense creates disincentives
for police revelation to the prosecutor, counter-incentives
favoring revelation exist.
These counter-incentives include
the desire of police to avoid convicting the wrong person,
their interest in alerting the prosecutor to evidence of which
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they do so;232 (3) the risk that government failure
to disclose exculpatory evidence will lead to
and
(4)
the
conviction
of
the
innocent;233
prosecutor’s heightened “ ministerial”
duty to
ensure disclosure, arising from the absence of
effective
adversary
safeguards
that
might
otherwise allow her to rely upon defense counsel
Regardless of how any
to achieve this goal.234
particular jurisdiction defines the prosecutor’s
duty to disclose information to the defense, the
prosecutor’s
need
to
become
aware
of
all
potentially exculpatory evidence known to law
enforcement agents remains constant.
The proposed amendments to Model Rule 3.8 and
Prosecution
Standard
3-3.ll
articulate
the
prosecutor’s ethical duty.
Proposed Rule 3.8(c1), requiring prosecutors to make “ reasonable
the defense might learn independently, and the risk and
consequences of later detection of police concealment. See id.
However, there is reason to doubt the influence of these
“ counter-incentives” during the routine processes of police
investigation and interviewing, when police decide what
information to gather, record, and retain. See Fisher, Just
the Facts, supra note 17, at 8-9 (arguing that pressures to
conserve
scarce
resources,
protect
themselves
from
embarrassment and civil liability, and ensure conviction of
presumptively guilty suspects lead police to ignore or
suppress exculpatory evidence); supra notes 137-142 and
accompanying text (stating reasons why police fail to gather
and preserve exculpatory facts).
232. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 51-52;
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
393, 443-45 (1992) [hereinafter Gershman, New Prosecutors]
(noting
the
“ failure
of
professional
disciplinary
organizations to deal with [prosecutorial] misconduct” );
Rosen, supra note 220, at 697 (observing that disciplinary
sanctions for violating Brady are rarely sought or imposed on
prosecutors).
233. See Gershman, New Prosecutors, supra note 232, at 451-53
(citing convictions of innocent persons in cases involving
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence); supra note
201.
234. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own:
Updating
the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of
Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923, 971 (1996) (citing
prosecutor’s “ ministerial”
role during the investigative
stage, in which prosecutors should “ [a]ctively seek all
evidence, whether the evidence is favorable or unfavorable to
any specific individual” ); see also Stanley Z. Fisher, In
Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15
Am. J. Crim. L. 197, 220-27 (1988) (arguing that absence of
adversary safeguards triggers heightened duty of prosecutorial
“ neutrality” ).
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efforts” to acquire exculpatory materials from the
police, would expose prosecutors to disciplinary
sanctions for failing to heed the Rule. Although
the
prospect
of
disciplinary
enforcement
is
remote,235 the proposed amendment would likely
affect prosecutorial behavior in other ways.
As
Roberta Flowers has written, the greatest benefit
of more specific ethics regulations “ is not in
their enforceability by disciplinary bodies, but
in
their
impact
on
a
prosecutor’s
self
reflection.” 236
The language proposed in Rule 3.8(c-1) and
Standard 3-3.11(a-1) partially revives a notion
expressed in the 1981 Proposed Final Draft of the
Prosecution Standards.
Draft Rule 3.8(d) would
have obligated the prosecutor to “ make reasonable
efforts to seek all evidence, whether or not
Because that
favorable to the defendant.” 237
proposal did not limit the prosecutor’s search
obligation to materials known to the police, it
was objected to because requiring the prosecutor
“ to conduct an investigation for and on behalf of
the defendant,” was viewed as unsupported by case
Not surprisingly,
authority and unenforceable.238
the proposal was abandoned in the final version of
the Rule. The proposed amendment is more modest,
insofar as it extends the prosecutor’s search duty
only to material and information known to the
In this respect, it evokes the English
police.239
235. See Gershman, New Prosecutors, supra note 232, at 44445; Rosen, supra note 220, at 697.
236. Flowers, supra note 234, at 964; see also id. at 964
n.322 (discussing the benefit of professional codes “ in
narrowing attorneys’ capacity for self-delusion about the
propriety of a given action” (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Why
the ABA Bothers:
A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 709 (1981))); Zacharias, supra
note 214, at 227-37 (explaining that codes serve purposes in
addition to defining punishable conduct).
237. Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of
Lawyers:
Statutes and Standards 248 (1997) (quoting 1981
draft of the rule
238. Summary of comments on Rule 3.8 received by Kutak
Commission, prepared for meeting on April 16-17 (Mar. 12,
1982) (sent to the author by Peter Geraghty, Director,
ETHICSearch, ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility)
(unpublished, on file with author).
239. This limitation is implied by the amendment.
It could
be made explicit by inserting after “ all material and
information”
the words “ known to them or in their
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practice of ensuring prosecutorial access to both
It also
the “ used” and “ unused” materials.240
uses the broader term “ material,” rather than
“ evidence,” to encompass tangible items that may
or may not be admissible in evidence.241
The proposed language obliges the prosecutor to
seek from investigators only those materials that
favor the defense. In view of the unsatisfactory
English experience of relying on the police to
screen for exculpatory evidence,242 an argument
exists for amending both Rule 3.8 and Standard 33.11 in broader terms.
These “ broader terms”
would require the prosecutor to seek from the
police all “ material and information relevant to
the defendant and the offense charged,” 243 as well
as
screening
the
material
personally
for
disclosable items.
In many routine proceedings,
this would be entirely feasible.
However, in
cases
involving
voluminous
materials,
the
prosecutor might be forced to rely on law
enforcement agents to select the disclosable
information.
For this reason, the proposed
language narrowly defines the materials that the
prosecutor should seek to obtain.
But the
Commentary should inform prosecutors that it is
desirable, when feasible, to review all relevant
materials in law enforcement possession.
2. Relation to Other Rules and Standards
Proposed Model Rule 3.8(c-1) is modeled upon Rule
3.8(e), which requires prosecutors to “ exercise
reasonable care to prevent investigators, law
possession.”
240. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
241. See Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial
by Jury Standard 11-2.1(a)(viii), 11-4.3(b) (3d ed. 1996)
(employing the terms “ information” and “ material” ).
242. See supra Part I.A.
243. See Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial
by Jury Standard 11-4.3(b); see also Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.11 cmt. (3d
ed. 1992) (“ The duty of the prosecutor is to acquire all the
relevant evidence without regard to its impact on the success
of the prosecution.” (emphasis added)); Flowers, supra note
234, at 971 (citing prosecutor’s “ ministerial” role during
the
investigative
stage,
in
which
prosecutors
should
“ [a]ctively seek all evidence, whether the evidence is
favorable or unfavorable to any specific individual” ).
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enforcement personnel [and other persons] . . .
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case
from making an extra judicial statement that the
prosecutor would be prohibited from making under
Rule 3.6.” 244 Both provisions essentially require
the prosecutor to “ police the police,” a duty
related in turn to Rule 8.4(a), which holds a
lawyer responsible for violations of the Rules
When prosecutors
though the acts of another.245
refrain
from
vigorously
seeking
potentially
disclosable evidence known to law enforcement
agents, they risk violating the spirit, if not the
letter, of Rule 8.4(a).
The proposed amendment to ABA Standard 3-3.11
goes beyond the existing text of that Standard in
two ways.
Unlike sub-paragraph 3.11(b), which
enjoins the prosecutor to “ make a reasonably
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request,” 246 the duty described in
proposed sub-paragraph 3.11(a-1) neither depends
upon a request from the defense, nor itself
imposes any duty to disclose.
Also, because the
proposed amendment would create an affirmative
duty to seek all exculpatory evidence known to law
enforcement
investigators,
it
differs
from
existing
sub-paragraph
3.11(c),
which
merely
forbids
intentionally
avoiding
“ pursuit
of
[exculpatory] evidence . . . .” 247
The proposed amendments to Standard 3-2.7 would
inform prosecutors of steps they should take to
obtain
all
exculpatory
material
in
police
possession.
In order to fulfill this obligation
prosecutors must be well informed about the
mechanics of police investigation and record
keeping in both routine and specialized police
244. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 (1999)
(reproduced infra, Appendix B).
245. See Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. William Hodes, 1 The Law of
Lawyering 699 (1998); see also Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 5.3 (describing a lawyer’s responsibility for
conduct of non-lawyers “ employed or retained by or associated
with a lawyer” ).
This provision does not make prosecutors
responsible for the conduct of police investigators when, as
is customary, the police operate independently of the
prosecutor’s office.
246. See Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal
Justice Standard 3-3.11(b).
247. See id. Standard 3-3.11.
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investigation. In most jurisdictions, a number of
relatively
autonomous
investigative
agencies
operate at different levels of local, state, and
These agencies are subject
federal government.248
to various internal regulations affecting recordkeeping,
but
the
contents
of
departmental
regulations are sometimes closely guarded.249 Also,
the
investigative
practices
of
American
law
enforcement
agencies
have
not
been
widely
In
such
environments,
American
studied.250
248. See Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure 9-10
(9th ed. 1999) (describing “ fragmentation” of enforcement
agencies, especially at the state level). But see Debra
Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice:
An
Essay on Accountability, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 815, 843 (1999)
(mentioning influence of the Commission on Accreditation for
Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) in articulating professional
standards and “ stimulating needed administrative reforms in
police departments across the country” ).
249. For example, in the city where I practiced as a public
defender in 1989-90, police department regulations were
treated as confidential, rather than public, documents.
State and local police agencies can probably restrict access
to their internal regulations more easily than can federal
investigative agencies, such as the FBI or DEA, which operate
as branches of large bureaucracies. See Kamisar et al., supra
note 248, at 9. I have found no literature on the subject of
record keeping requirements of federal law enforcement
agencies.
Their official manuals of investigation are not
generally available to the public.
Perhaps as a result of
requests made under the Freedom of Information Act, however,
photocopied portions of unpublished manuals are available upon
request.
For example, the FBI Manual of Investigative
Operations and Guidelines, 1927-78 (formerly called the “ FBI
Manuals
of
Instruction,
Investigative
Procedures
and
Guidelines, 1927-1978” ), is available from the FBI on
microfiche. Also, a table of contents of the 1986 edition is
available, and members of the public may order photocopies of
particular sections. Portions of the DEA Agents Manual became
available to the defense bar in 1999, apparently for the first
time, as a result of a Freedom of Information Act request. See
NACDL Makes DEA Agents’ Manual Available— Well, Most of It, 13
Crim. Practice Rep. (BNA), no. 3, at 44 (1999).
250. Although some studies have been done in the United
States, see, e.g., Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at
18-21 & n.93 (describing various approaches taken in the study
of police investigative practices), we know relatively little
about police investigative procedures and record-keeping in
this country. Thus, it was possible for a scholar to declare
in 1975:
“ Regrettably, empirical studies of detectives are
nowhere to be found. As with most of the specialized units,
hypotheses about decision-making are made . . . , but with
very little evidence in the literature as foundation.”
William B. Sanders, Detective Work 6 (1977) (quoting Harold
Pepinsky, Police Decision-making, in Decision-making in the
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prosecutors— particularly at the state level— may
face a difficult challenge simply to discover what
investigative records are regularly kept, by whom,
and where.251 This undoubtedly poses an obstacle to
implementation of the prosecutor’s disclosure
obligations.
Proposed Standard
3-2.7(c) directs
the prosecutor to become familiar with existing
police
record-keeping
practices
in
her
jurisdiction.
This requirement reflects the view
that a prosecutor’s ability to carry out her duty
to learn what potentially exculpatory evidence
exists in any case depends initially on her
understanding of those practices.
Such an
understanding is also crucial to the prosecutor’s
obligation, expressed in the proposed paragraph 32.7(d),
to
promote
adoption
of
satisfactory
uniform reports of criminal investigations.
The advantages of uniform police report forms are
obvious.252 In its 1973 report on the Courts, the
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals (“ NAC” ) recommended that
prosecutors “ should develop for the use of the
Criminal Justice System, at 27 (Don M. Gottfredson ed.,
Rockville, Md.:
National Institute of Mental Health 1975)).
By way of contrast, British scholars have conducted an
impressive number of empirical studies on police investigative
procedures in England, many of which are cited in this
Article.
See,
e.g.,
John
Baldwin
&
Timothy
Moloney,
Supervision of Police Investigations in Serious Criminal Cases
(Royal Comm’n on Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 4, 1992);
John Baldwin, Preparing the Record of Taped Interview (Royal
Comm’n on Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 2, 1992); John
Baldwin, The Role of Legal Representatives at the Police
Station (Royal Comm’n on Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 3,
1992); Barrie Irving & Ian McKenzie, A Brief Review of
Relevant Police Training (Royal Comm’n on Crim. Justice,
Research Study No. 21, 1993); Irving & Dunnighan, supra note
109; Michael Levi, The Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of
Serious Fraud (Royal Comm’n on Crim. Justice, Research Study
No. 14, 1993); Maguire & Norris, supra note 108.
251. See, e.g., Palmer v. City of Chicago, 562 F. Supp. 1067,
1071 (N.D. Ill. 1983), order rev’d by, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.
1985) (noting that Chicago prosecutors may have been unaware
of the city-wide system of “ double” police files); People v.
Young, 591 N.E.2d 1163, 1165 & n. (1992) (telling how New York
City prosecutors discovered a Police Department practice of
generating intra-departmental “ unofficial” “ confidential”
reports that were not disclosed to prosecutors).
252. For a discussion of the functions and content of typical
police incident reports, see Fisher, Just the Facts, supra
note 17, at 4-6.
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police a basic police report form that includes
all relevant information about the offense and the
offender
necessary
for
charging,
plea
In making this
negotiations, and trial.” 253
recommendation, the commission stated:
The police report form is the single most
important document in the prosecutor’s case file.
Prosecutors . . . rely on the police report to
identify necessary witnesses, to familiarize
themselves with the facts of the case, and to
identify the problems that may arrive at trial.
Since the police report form is the basic
prosecutive document, it should be designed by
the prosecutor to meet his requirements and not
by the police based on their interpretation of
the prosecutor’s requirements.254

The
National
District
Attorneys
Association
(“ NDAA” ),
in
Commentary
to
its
National
Prosecution Standards, also urged prosecutors to
develop uniform police reports.255 According to the
NDAA, a proper report form “ insures that all
information necessary for a successful prosecution
The NDAA
is available for each case.” 256
Commentary also supports discretionary disclosure
of “ merely potentially useful material” to the
defense, a position which logically presupposes
prosecutorial access to such material in police
Reflecting
these
recommendations,
hands.257
253. Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Crim. Justice Standards and
Goals, Courts 247 (1973) [hereinafter Nat’l Advisory Comm’n,
Courts]. The Commission’s recommendation was not reflected in
its standards for the police. See Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on
Crim. Justice Standards and Goals, Police 570-73 (1973)
[hereinafter Nat’l Advisory Comm’n, Police].
254. Nat’l Advisory Comm’n, Courts, supra note 253, at 248.
The Commission’s Report added: “ A well-designed report form
should require police officers to detail all of the evidence
which supports each element of the offense, the relevant
surrounding circumstances, and all known witnesses and their
addresses.” Id.
255. See Nat’l District Attorneys Ass’n, National Prosecution
Standards Standard 22.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter NDAA
Standards].
256. Id. (“ The prosecutor has the expertise to design a form
that will fit both the needs of prosecution and those of local
law enforcement.” ).
257. See
id.
Standard
53.1-53.5
cmt.
(stating
that
prosecutors should consider the rule of Arizona v. Youngblood
as “ the minimum standard and not a reason for denial of
discretionary . . . disclosure that aids the administration of
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proposed paragraph 2.7(d) expressly states that
uniform police reports should contain potentially
exculpatory information.258
The commentary to proposed Standard 3-2.7 should
address and elaborate upon the connection between
the prosecutor’s duties under Kyles, and her
obligations under sub-paragraphs 2.7(a) and (b) to
assist in advising and training the police.
First, the commentary should advise prosecutors to
promote police training in the importance of
recording, preserving, and revealing potentially
exculpatory evidence to prosecutors.
Second, it
should stress the importance of persuading the
police to adopt reporting forms that would include
specific categories of potentially exculpatory
In these ways, the commentary would
evidence.259
reinforce the duties in Model Rule 3.8 and
Prosecution Standard 3-3.11, as amended.
Also,
Model Rule 3.8, Standard 3-3.11, and Standard 32.7 should cross-refer to each other.
3. Training Police in the Importance of Revealing
Potentially Exculpatory Evidence to Prosecutors
Prosecutors’ access to exculpatory evidence known
to
the
police
depends
ultimately
on
the
willingness of police to record, preserve, and
reveal such evidence. Despite pressures inclining
police against such practices,260 they also have an
interest
in
cooperating
with
prosecutors
to
implement Brady. As Professor Kevin McMunigal has
pointed out, police have an interest, especially
in
the
early
stages
of
investigation,
in
exonerating innocent suspects in order to refocus
Training
their efforts on finding the guilty.261
justice;” the prosecutor should set an office standard that
goes beyond the rule in Youngblood and make it known that the
office expects the same for law enforcement agencies.)
258. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text; cf.
Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury
Standard 11-4.4(c) (3d ed. 1996) (requiring prosecutors to
“ make reasonable efforts to ensure that material and
information relevant to the defendant and the offense charged
is provided by investigative personnel to the prosecutor’s
office” ).
259. See infra notes 289-317 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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should stress the risk that suppression of
exculpatory evidence will lead to conviction of
the innocent. More particularly, it should— as in
England— stress the potentially exonerative value
of
“ negative
information”
and
“ first
Like
much
descriptions”
from
witnesses.262
potentially exculpatory evidence, such information
is “ casually acquired” by the police as a byproduct of the search for incriminating evidence.263
If police reports specifically required inclusion
of such information, prosecutors would be better
able to comply with Kyles.
The growing ease of
electronic
recording
and
transmission
of
investigative data should reduce the costs to
police of expanding reporting requirements in this
way.264
As part of their mission to offer the police
legal advice and training, prosecutors should also
educate
the
police
in
their
increasing
vulnerability to suit, both as individuals and
agencies, under the federal Civil Rights Act.265
Such knowledge should give police a powerful
reason to cooperate with prosecution efforts to
establish
a
regular
flow
of
potentially
exculpatory evidence from investigators to the
Although police have no
prosecutor’s office.266
constitutional
duty
to
gather
exculpatory
evidence,267 and only a qualified duty to preserve
262. See supra notes 121-58 and accompanying text.
263. See McMunigal, supra note 22, at 1000 (citing Professor
Kronman’s distinction between “ casually” and “ deliberately”
acquired information, in Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,
Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2
(1978)).
264. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
265. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
Other possible sanctions
include reversal of a guilty defendant’s conviction, criminal
liability, and internal discipline.
266. See Slobogin, supra note 149, at 392-400 (describing how
entity liability of police departments promotes systemic
deterrence,
achieved
through
training
and
internal
discipline).
267. Once police have established probable cause, they have
no constitutional duty to investigate further. See Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979) (holding that after
valid arrest, police have no duty to investigate arrestee’s
claims of innocence); White v. Tamlyn, 961 F. Supp. 1047, 1062
(E.D. Mich. 1997) (finding no duty to seek test of arrestee’s
blood for cocaine).
The White court found no case “ which
holds that the due process clause is violated when the police
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such
evidence
once
it
comes
into
their
possession,268 they are constitutionally required to
reveal Brady material to the prosecutor.269 Unlike
prosecutors, who are absolutely immune from civil
liability
for
violating
a
defendant’s
Brady
rights,270 police officers have only a defense of
fail to gather potentially exculpatory evidence.” White, 961
F. Supp. at 1062 (quoting Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116,
1119 (9th Cir. 1989)). The White court also characterized the
holding in Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d at 1119, that “ a bad
faith failure to collect potentially exculpatory evidence
would violate the due process clause,” as “ an aberration and
the law only in the Ninth Circuit.” White, 961 F. Supp. at
1062 n.12.
268. The
due
process
clause
does
not
impose
“ an
undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve
all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary
significance in a particular prosecution.”
Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
Under Youngblood and
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), the state’s duty
to preserve exculpatory evidence applies only to “ material”
evidence, i.e., “ evidence that might be expected to play a
significant role in the suspect’s defense.” Trombetta, 467
U.S. at 488. Relief depends on the defendant’s showing that
the exculpatory
nature of the evidence was apparent to the
police at the time they lost or destroyed it, and that the
police acted in bad faith.
See, e.g., United States v.
Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 219 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding no
constitutional violation where police failed to preserve a
dispatch tape because there was no evidence that the dispatch
tape would contain exculpatory information).
269. As a precondition for recovery under section 1983, the
plaintiff must have suffered harm by conviction or punishment.
See Williams v. Krystopa, No. Civ. A. 98-CV-1119, 1998 WL
961375, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1998) (holding that despite
the egregious conduct of the prosecution and the police in
suppressing a police report, the Brady violation resulted in
no due process deprivation because the defendant, plaintiff in
the section 1983 action, was acquitted at trial after spending
530 days in an adult correctional facility between the time of
arraignment and acquittal).
Also, plaintiff’s conviction or
sentence must have “ been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . .
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus . . . .” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 487 (1994). The police duty is to disclose evidence to
the prosecutor or the court, not to the defense. See Jean v.
Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other
grounds, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999) (finding police absolutely
immune from civil suit for failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense).
270. See, e.g., Jean, 155 F.3d at 705 (citing Kalina v.
Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997)) (holding prosecutors absolutely
immune from suit when performing functions that require the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Reid v. New Hampshire,
56 F.3d 332, 336 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that a prosecutor
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“ qualified
immunity”
for
their
actions.271
Therefore, an officer is liable if a reasonable
official would have known that his failure to
disclose evidence to the prosecutor violated
clearly established constitutional rights under
Brady.272
The recent case of Jean v. Collins273 illustrates
the operation of qualified immunity in this
context.
Lesly Jean was convicted of rape and
given two consecutive life sentences.
He spent
nine years in prison before his conviction was
reversed because of Brady violations.274 Following
his release, Jean sued the police under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for failing to reveal exculpatory evidence.
A Fourth Circuit panel ruled that the police have
a direct duty under Brady to disclose material
exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor:
If the police allow the State’s Attorney to
produce evidence pointing to guilt without ever
informing
him
of
other
evidence
in
their
possession which contradicts this inference,
state officers are practicing deception not only
on the State’s Attorney but on the court and the
defendant . . . .275

On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit en banc conceded
the existence of this duty,276 but, adopting a
rigorous test for deciding whether the duty to
disclose was “ clearly established” at the time
the police failed to disclose, held that plaintiff
had failed to satisfy the test.277 On review, the
cannot be held personally liable for knowing suppression of
exculpatory information); Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550,
1552-53 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1975)) (finding of absolute immunity for claim based on
prosecutor’s alleged solicitation of false testimony).
271. See Jean, 155 F.3d at 708.
272. See id.
273. 155 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 1998)
274. See Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82, 83 (4th Cir. 1991).
275. Jean v. Collins, 107 F.3d 1111, 1119 (4th Cir. 1997)
(Hamilton, J., concurring) (quoting Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d
842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964)), vacated en banc, 155 F.3d 701 (4th
Cir.1998), vacated on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999).
276. See Jean, 155 F.3d at 710 & n.3.
277. Over a dissent by five judges, the Fourth Circuit held
that, to determine whether a right was clearly established at
a particular time, a federal circuit court need not look
beyond decisions of the Supreme Court, the relevant circuit
court, and the highest court of the state in which the case
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Supreme
Court
summarily
vacated
the
Fourth
Circuit’s
opinion,
remanding
the
case
for
reconsideration in light of an intervening case
that also upheld a claim of qualified immunity for
law enforcement officials.278
Both the Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court
opinions in Jean show an inclination to grant
qualified immunity to police officers unless
fairly
explicit
authority
establishes
the
unconstitutionality of their conduct. With regard
to the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the prosecutor, however, the immunity defense is
becoming obsolete.
Although some courts have
upheld police immunity on the ground that, at the
relevant time, the duty to disclose was not
“ clearly established,” 279 a growing number of
courts have recognized the duty.280
arose. See id. at 709.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Murnaghan accused the Jean majority of moving “ to a rule of
actually unqualified, though technically called qualified,
immunity for police officers [by, inter alia] a dramatic
narrowing of that law which, for police officers, will be
considered well-settled at the critical time.” Id. at 712-13.
278. See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1695 (1999)
(upholding Fourth Circuit finding of qualified immunity of
defendant state and federal law enforcement officials against
claim that their actions violated the Fourth Amendment for
allowing media to enter a home searched pursuant to a warrant,
on ground that the right allegedly violated was not “ clearly
established” at the time).
The Court suggested that the
plaintiff needs to show either “ cases of controlling
authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident
which clearly established the rule on which they seek to
rely,” or “ a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such
that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his
actions were lawful.” Id. at 1700.
279. See Jean, 155 F.3d at 708, 710 & n.3 (ruling that
although reasonable police officer in 1982 would not have
known that failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to
prosecutor
violated
criminal
defendant’s
Brady
right,
intervening court decisions “ now provide notice to police
officers that they can be subject to monetary damages under
section 1983 for failure to disclose” ). The Fourth Circuit’s
dictum in Jean was qualified, but essentially preserved, in an
unpublished disposition. See Walker v. Sopher, Nos. 95-2248 &
96-1088, 1998 WL 682283, at **3 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1998)).
280. See Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 114 (1st Cir. 1999);
McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996);
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988);
Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1559 (5th Cir. 1988);
Williams v. Krystopa, No. Civ. A. 98-CV-1119, 1998 WL 961375,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1998); Hernandez-Fontan v. City of
Lancaster, No. Civ. A. 96-CV-5653, 1998 WL 474171 at *7 n.12
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Beyond the liability of individual officers, a
police department’s failure to establish and
enforce procedures governing the disclosure of
exculpatory evidence might subject the responsible
city or county to liability under section 1983.281
This theory was argued in Carter v. Harrison,282 by
a plaintiff who had spent 28 months in prison for
a murder he did not commit.
Alleging police
suppression of crucial exculpatory statements by
several witnesses, he sued the city under section
1983, claiming injury from its policy or custom of
failing to train and supervise police to implement
Brady.283 A federal district court found sufficient
evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to
the city’s “ grossly negligent” or “ deliberately
The court rejected as
indifferent” failure.284
inadequate written guidelines requiring detectives
to record all “ relevant evidence:”
The recording of “ all relevant evidence” does
not
accomplish
the
goal
of
recording
and
preserving
exculpatory
evidence.
A
police
officer investigating a crime is likely to assume
that relevant evidence includes only inculpatory
information.285
(E.D. Pa. July 31, 1998); Ahlers v. Schebil, 966 F. Supp. 518,
527 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Carter v. Harrison, 612 F. Supp. 749,
756 & n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
281. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690-95
(1978);
see
also
Jack
M.
Beermann,
Municipal
Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DePaul L. Rev.
627, 651-67 (1999) (discussing municipal liability for failure
to train employees to avoid violating federal rights);
Livingston, supra note 248, at 822 (1999) (discussing use of
consent
decrees
under
Violent
Crime
Control
and
Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (1994), which
prohibits governmental authorities from engaging in “ a
pattern
or
practice
of
conduct
by
law
enforcement
officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States” ).
282. 612 F. Supp. 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
283. See id. at 754.
284. Id. at 759; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 388 (1989) (finding municipal liability for failure to
train or supervise requires proof of city’s “ deliberate
indifference” to the rights of those with whom municipal
employees will come into contact).
285. Carter, 612 F. Supp. at 756; see also Fisher, Just the
Facts, supra note 17, at 27-28 (concluding from examination of
police training materials, which commonly instruct police to
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By implication, municipalities risk liability if
they fail expressly to train police to record,
preserve and reveal exculpatory evidence.286
By adopting rules and standards stressing the
prosecutor’s obligation to make the police aware
of the need to collect and reveal negative
information, the ABA would reinforce the courts’
growing willingness to impose civil liability on
police who suppress such evidence.
In the end,
the prospect of such liability is likely to give
police the greatest incentive to overcome their
reluctance to “ help” the accused.
4. Specific Categories of Potentially Exculpatory
Evidence that Prosecutors Should Routinely Seek
from Police
In addition to elaborating the prosecutor’s role
as legal advisor to the police, the proposed
commentary to Standard 3-2.7 should stress the
importance of persuading the police to adopt
reporting forms that would call for specific
categories of potentially exculpatory evidence.
On this point, both the English system, and
recently adopted local rules for the federal
District
Court
for
Massachusetts,
suggest
directions for reform.
As described in Part II of this Article, the
English use detailed codes to describe the types
of information that police must record, retain and
These codes
make available to prosecutors.287
provide checklists of potentially exculpatory
evidence— such
as
notebook
entries,
first
descriptions by potential witnesses, information
report
“ all
relevant
information,”
that
“ [b]y
implication . . . exculpatory evidence does not qualify” ).
286. Section 1983 claims against municipalities may also rest
upon failure to train prosecutors to disclose Brady material.
See Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 300 (2d. Cir.
1992) (finding that complete failure by district attorney to
train prosecutors on compliance with Brady could constitute
“ deliberate indifference” under section 1983).
Walker had
been convicted of murder and spent 19 years in prison. The
prosecutor failed to disclose, among other things, that a
witness failed to pick Walker out of a lineup, instead
identifying another man, “ apparently a police officer,” as
the perpetrator. Id. at 295.
287. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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from tapes or telephone records, defendant’s
explanation of an offense288— which alert both the
police and prosecutors to the possible existence
of specific materials that might be disclosable to
the defense.
In contrast, American court rules
and
standards
rarely
specify
categories
of
exculpatory
evidence
that
prosecutors
must
disclose
and,
therefore,
obtain
from
investigators.
Instead, guidance takes the form
of general formulae, ranging from constitutionally
mandated disclosure of “ favorable and material”
evidence,
to
sub-constitutional
standards
requiring
disclosure
of
evidence
that
is
“ exculpatory,” 289 or that “ tends to negate the
guilt of the accused.” 290 These formulae leave the
precise scope and timing of the disclosure duty
unclear, particularly with respect to evidence
that does not directly exculpate the defendant.291
288. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
289. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14; Mich. R. Crim. P. 6.201; Miss.
Uniform Cir. and County Ct. R. 9.04; Wis. Stat. Ann. §
971.23(1) (West 1998). Some state court discovery rules limit
the prosecutor’s disclosure duty to “ any material evidence
favorable” to the defendant. See N.M. R. Dist. Ct. R. Crim.
P. 5-501; Penn. R. Crim. P. 305.
290. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
291. Disputes often occur over whether, and when, prosecutors
must disclose evidence that would impeach the credibility of
prosecution
witnesses
or
provide
leads
to
exculpatory
evidence. The Supreme Court has interpreted Brady to allow no
distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory
evidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77
(1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
Professional responsibility rules and standards are at least
as broad. However, none of these duties necessarily apply at
the pretrial stage. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
Professional responsibility rules typically require “ timely”
disclosure to the defense, reflecting Brady’s ambiguity as to
the precise timing required. See Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.8(d) (1999); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 7-103(B) (1980); Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function
Standard 3-3.11 (a) (3d ed. 1992).
This ambiguity permits
prosecutors to interpret pretrial disclosure rules as
not
extending to impeachment evidence. See, e.g., Franklin, supra
note 221, at 568-69, 574-76 (discussing how some federal
prosecutors in Northern California feel free to refrain from
requesting from investigators, or disclosing, impeachment
material); cf. United States v. Owens, 933 F. Supp. 76, 85-86
(D. Mass. 1996) (construing First Circuit cases to require
disclosure “ coincident with the scope of cross-examination to
be afforded in a criminal case” ).
For an overview of the many questions that have arisen in
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In response to uncertainty regarding the scope of
required pretrial disclosure by the prosecution, a
court could supplement the general standards
defining what must be disclosed with rules
describing specific categories of exculpatory
evidence.
This
approach
is
taken
by
the
innovative discovery rules recently adopted by the
United States District Court for Massachusetts.292
Designed to “ minimize the possibility that the
government will fail to meet its responsibilities
[and] to maximize consistency in the practices
among prosecutors and judicial officers,” 293 these
rules articulate the specific requirements of
Brady more comprehensively and in more detail than
other rules or standards.
Because they itemize
material that courts might require prosecutors to
disclose,
they
provide
prosecutors
with
a
framework
for
deciding
what
potentially
exculpatory information they should seek from the
police.294
Subject to judicially-approved exceptions in the
the Local Rules require
interest of justice,295
automatic disclosure in felony cases of specified
categories of evidence, including both general296
applying Brady see James Lappan, 79 Questions: The Catechism
of Brady v. Maryland, 35 Crim. L. Bull. 277 (1999).
292. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
293. The new rules also aim “ to implement the principle that
different forms of exculpatory information should ordinarily
be disclosed at different times.”
Mass. Rules Committee
Report, supra note 207, at 5.
294. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.2(A).
295. See id. Rule 116.6.
The Rules include procedures for
resolving discovery disputes before trial. See id. Rules
116.3, 117.1.
The most recent edition of the ABA Standards
for Discovery offers a different version of this approach.
They require broad, automatic disclosure of “ all relevant
information”
held
by
the
team
of
prosecution
and
investigatory personnel, see Standards for Criminal Justice
Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 11-2.1(a) cmt. (3d ed.
1996), as well as specific items of relevant information, such
as the names and addresses of “ all persons known to the
prosecution to have information concerning the offense
charged, together with all written statements,” id. Standard
11-2.1(a)(ii), and all tangible items that pertain to the
case. See id. Standard 11-2.1(a)(v).
296. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.1(C).
This category includes, inter alia, all identification
procedures. Thus, the government must disclose “ [a] written
statement whether the defendant was a subject of an
investigative identification procedure . . . involving a line-
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The Rules expand and
and exculpatory297 evidence.
clarify
the
prosecutor’s
duty
to
disclose
exculpatory evidence in three ways.
First, the
Rules
expansively
define
the
concept
of
“ exculpatory”
information
that
must
be
disclosed.298 Second, they regulate the presumptive
up, show-up, photo spread or other display of an image of the
defendant.” Id. Rule 116.1(C)(1)(f). The rule also requires
that “ [i]f the defendant was a subject of such a procedure, a
copy of any videotape, photo spread, image or other tangible
evidence
reflecting,
used
in
or
memorializing
the
identification
procedure.”
Id.;
see
also
id.
Rule
116.2(B)(1)(f) (requiring a written description of the failure
of any percipient witness to make a positive identification of
defendant at identification procedure).
297. See id. Rule 116.2.
298. The Rule’s drafters rejected as unsatisfactory the
Supreme Court’s limitation of Brady to “ material” evidence,
defined retrospectively as existing “ only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985).
“ Reasonable probability”
was defined as “ a
probability
sufficient
to
undermine
confidence
in
the
outcome.” Id.
Recognizing the need for a more useful test in the pretrial
context, the Rules Committee adopted a prospective test drawn
from Kyles.
Favorable evidence is “ material” for purposes
of required disclosure:
if there is a reasonable probability that, if the
evidence is disclosed to the defendant, he could
properly be acquitted because of the presence of a
reasonable doubt or acceptance of an explanation for
the crime that does not inculpate the defendant . . . .
Mass. Rules Committee Report, supra note 207, at V(A) (citing
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-35 (1995)).
Expanding
upon this definition, the Committee cited with apparent
approval the District of Columbia Circuit’s interpretation of
“ materiality” as used in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(a)(1)(C), requiring pretrial production by the government
of documents “ which are material to the preparation of the
defendants’ defense.”
Materiality exists where there is:
some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the
disputed
evidence
would
enable
the
defendant
significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his
favor.
This materiality standard normally is not a
heavy burden, rather, evidence is material as long as
there is a strong indication that it will play an
important role in uncovering admissible evidence,
aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or
assisting impeachment or rebuttal.
Id. at V(A) (quoting United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351
(D.C. Cir. 1993)) (citations, internal quotations and ellipses
omitted).
The Committee Report, acknowledges that “ neither
the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has addressed the
definition of materiality in this context, and this issue may
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timing of disclosure of different categories of
evidence.299 Third, and most significantly for our
purposes,
they
require
the
prosecutor
automatically to disclose a number of specific
categories of information without regard to the
prosecutor’s judgment whether, in a particular
case,
the
information
is
“ material”
and
The Local Rules
“ favorable to the accused.” 300
thus resemble the English model in two respects:
first, they “ codify”
particular categories of
information which are presumptively disclosable;
and
second,
they
specifically
require
the
prosecutor to obtain that information from the
police.301
have to be resolved in the litigation of future cases in this
District . . . .” Id.
Inspired by this broadened standard of “ materiality” the
Rules define disclosable exculpatory evidence as follows:
“ Exculpatory information,”
which must be disclosed
includes but is not limited to “ all information that
is material and favorable to the accused” because it
tends to:
(1) Cast doubt on defendant’s guilt as to any essential
element in any count in the indictment or information;
(2) Cast doubt on the admissibility of [certain]
evidence that the government anticipates offering in
its case-in-chief, that might be subject to a motion to
suppress or exclude . . . .;
(3) Cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of any
evidence that the government anticipates offering in
its case-in-chief; or
(4) Diminish the degree of the defendant’s culpability
or . . . Offense Level under [sentencing guidelines].”
D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.2(A).
299. Unlike the previous Rules, which required routine
disclosure of exculpatory evidence “ as soon as counsels’
trial engagements permit and in all events within fourteen
(14) days after arraignment,” the 1998 Rules establish four
different presumptive times for the disclosure of different
categories of evidence. See D. Mass Local R. Concerning Crim.
Cases 116.2(B).
Once triggered, the duty to disclose is
continuous. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases
116.7. It is not clear when the duty ends.
300. See infra notes 302-15 and accompanying text.
301. Local Rule 116.8 requires the prosecutor to inform
“ all . . . law enforcement agencies formally participating in
the criminal investigation . . . of the discovery obligations
set forth [in the Rules] and obtain any information subject to
disclosure from each such agency.”
D. Mass. Local R.
Concerning Crim. Cases 116.8. Both Rule 116.8 and Rule 116.9,
requiring police to preserve relevant documents in their
possession, apply only to law enforcement agents whose agency
at the time was formally participating in a criminal
investigation. See id. Rules 116.8, 116.9; see also supra Part
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In addition to automatically disclosable general
information, such as identification procedures,302
the Rules require automatic pretrial disclosure of
three kinds of exculpatory information:
(1)
“ [i]nformation that would tend directly to negate
the defendant’s guilt” of the charged offenses;303
(2) “ [i]nformation that would cast doubt on the
admissibility of evidence that the government
anticipates offering in its case-in-chief;” 304 and
(3) “ [a]ny information that tends to cast doubt on
the credibility or accuracy”
of evidence and
witnesses
that
the
government
anticipates
presenting in its case-in-chief.305 The Rules go on
to list specific items of exculpatory information
regarding the government’s anticipated case-inchief
witnesses
that
must
be
disclosed:
information
regarding
promises,
rewards
or
inducements,306 criminal records,307 pending criminal
cases,308 the witness’ failure to make a positive
identification
of
the
defendant
in
an
any
inconsistent
identification
procedure,309
statements made by the witness,310 statements made
by any person that are inconsistent with any
statement made by the witness,311 information
reflecting the witness’ bias or prejudice against

I.C.2.a. (discussing disclosure responsibilities under the
English system).
The scope of Rule 116.1(A)(1) is broader,
subjecting to automatic discovery “ all discoverable material
and information in the possession, custody, or control of the
government . . . the existence of which is known, or by the
exercise
of
due
diligence
may
become
known,
to
the
[prosecutor] . . . .”
D. Mass. R. Concerning Crim. Cases
116.1(A)(1).
302. See
D.
Mass.
Local
R.
Concerning
Crim.
Cases
116.1(C)(1)(f).
303. Id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(a).
304. Id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(b).
305. Id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(a).
306. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(c).
307. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(d).
308. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(e).
309. See
id.
Rule
116.2(B)(1)(f).
(applying
only
to
percipient witnesses “ identified by name” ).
310. “ [O]r a description of such a statement, made orally or
in writing . . . regarding the alleged criminal conduct of the
defendant.” Id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(b).
311. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(c).
Oral statements are
included, and the witness’ statement must be about the alleged
criminal conduct of the defendant. See id.
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committed
by
the
the defendant,312 bad acts
witness,313 and information regarding any mental or
physical impairment that may cast doubt on the
witness’
ability
to
testify
accurately
or
truthfully.314 The Rules also require disclosure of
a “ failure of any percipient witness . . . to make
a positive identification of a defendant” at an
identification procedure.315
The Local Rules are significant not simply
because they require broad disclosure to the
defense,316 but because they articulate the specific
requirements of Brady in such detail. They could,
therefore, guide prosecutors in deciding what
potentially exculpatory information they should
seek from the police.
For example, many of the
items required by the Local Rules are readily
known to investigators, and could be reported in
designated
spaces
on
standard
and/or
on
supplementary
forms
for
reporting
criminal
incidents and arrests. For instance, report forms
could call for “ first descriptions”
of the
perpetrator, an account of any identification
procedure, and the failure of any percipient
witness to identify the suspect.
Report forms
could also call for inconsistent statements made
by inculpating witnesses, as well as observed
mental
or
physical
impairments,
such
as
intoxication, that might cast doubt on their
ability to report accurately. Other categories of
information, such as exculpatory statements made
by the suspect and others, could also be expressly
sought.
312. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(d).
313. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(f).
Specifically, such
background includes any prosecutable federal offense, or
conduct that may be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
608(b), known by the government to have been committed by the
witness. See id.
314. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(g).
315. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(f) (emphasis added); supra note
302.
316. Judicial precedents support most if not all of the
Rules’ disclosure requirements.
The Supreme Court has held
that the prosecutor’s Brady duty extends to evidence affecting
witness credibility. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 674-78 (1985).
Regarding specific types of impeachment
evidence that must be disclosed, see Illinois Institute for
Continuing Legal Education, Federal Criminal Practice, § 7.51
(1997) (collecting cases).

FISHER BP

184

04/07/00 11:46 AM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Other items required by the Rules— such as prior
bad acts or pending investigations or prosecutions
against prospective government witnesses— might
not be suited for inclusion in standard police
reports, because they involve facts that would not
normally be known by the investigating officer.
Prosecutors could seek this information from the
police by means of other, later-transmitted forms.
Precisely what information should be reported, at
what level of detail, in what kinds of cases, and
at what stages of the proceedings, are matters
beyond the scope of this Article.
Reasonable
people might disagree on the particulars of any
proposal, but not, I think, on the principle that
prosecutors should endeavor to persuade police to
include
exculpatory
information
on
police
The duty to undertake that effort
reports.317
follows from the prosecutor’s responsibility to
meet the challenge posed by Kyles.
CONCLUSION
In Kyles v. Whitley,318 the Supreme Court asserted
that a prosecutor has “ the means to discharge the
government’s
Brady
responsibility,”
by
establishing “ procedures and regulations”
to
ensure a flow of all relevant information from the

317. One might object to inclusion of exculpatory evidence on
police reports on the ground that, in jurisdictions allowing
defense discovery of such reports, the defense might gain
access to material that would not otherwise be disclosable,
and exploit it in damaging ways. See Fisher, Just the Facts,
supra note 17, at 56-58 (suggesting that the solution of
restricting defense access to, or use of, reported material,
is preferable to the current regime, which tolerates police
suppression of relevant information from the prosecutor). One
could also consider the English procedure in which the police
use separate schedules to reveal sensitive material to the
prosecutor and reveal “ super-sensitive”
material to the
prosecutor orally. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33,
§§ 6.12-6.14.
The English also permit the prosecution to
apply ex parte for judicial approval to withhold otherwise
disclosable sensitive material from the defense, under the
doctrine of public interest immunity. See Leng & Taylor, supra
note 31, at 22, 47-48.
By insisting that police do reveal
even sensitive material to the prosecutor, and requiring
judicial approval of non-disclosure in special circumstances,
the English system has the advantage of making and preserving
a record of relevant, non-disclosed material for later review.
318. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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In reality, such
police to her office.319
procedures are generally lacking.
The English
have
legislated
a
comprehensive
regulatory
framework for police record-keeping and revelation
of case information to the prosecutor. They have
also devoted significant resources to enforcing
this regulation.
The English system contrasts
starkly with our laissez-faire approach to police
record-keeping.
As reflected in the Supreme Court’s treatment of
the
issue
in
Kyles,
we
have
consigned
to
prosecutors the duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence known to the police, without devoting
particular attention or resources to the issue of
implementation.
To be sure, as the English
experience illustrates, the cost-efficiency of a
comprehensive and ambitious effort to produce more
“ objective” records of investigation is open to
question. Nonetheless, the seriousness with which
the English have addressed the Kyles issue
compares favorably to our own posture of denial
and neglect.
Because neither legislatures nor
courts
will
likely
redress
this
problem,
prosecutors
must
take
responsibility
for
establishing the “ procedures and regulations”
referred to in Kyles.
The current professional
responsibility
rules
and
standards
do
not
adequately
recognize
and
support
that
responsibility.
The amendments proposed here to
the ABA Model Rules and Standards represent a
modest step toward breathing life into a process,
described in Kyles, which should but does not yet
exist.

319. Id. at 438 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972)).
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APPENDIX A
ORGANIZATION OF CRIMINAL COURTS, PROSECUTION AND POLICE, AND
POLICE RECORD-KEEPING, IN ENGLAND
Jurisdiction of Courts
Criminal offences in England fall into one of
three jurisdictional categories:
“ summary,”
“ indictable only,”
and “ either-way.”
“ Summary
offences,” which comprise the vast majority of all
criminal offenses,320 are tried without a jury in
the magistrates’ court.321 The most serious crimes
are prosecuted by indictment in the Crown Court,
before a jury.
“ Either-way” offenses are tried
either in magistrates’ court or in Crown Court, at
First appearances and
the defendant’s option.322
other preliminary proceedings for all criminal
defendants occur in the magistrates’ court; in
appropriate cases, magistrates hold “ committal
proceedings” to decide whether sufficient evidence
exists to commit a defendant for trial in the
Crown Court.323
Prosecution
Until 1985, England employed a system of private
prosecution under which the police themselves
prosecuted minor crimes, and retained lawyers to
prosecute more serious crimes. In 1879, the post
of Director of Public Prosecutions (“ DPP” ) was
The
created in the Attorney-General’s office.324
DPP was given power to control prosecutions for
In 1986, with the
the most serious crimes.325
creation
of
the
Crown
Prosecution
Service
320. Over 90% of criminal cases are heard at the magistrates’
courts. See Niblett, supra note 31, at 35.
321. In a summary trial a panel of three lay magistrates
usually decides the case. See Hatchard, supra note 31, at 181.
322. See id.
323. As a result of 1998 legislation, a new system is being
introduced by which cases triable on indictment only will go
immediately to Crown Court without any committal hearings. See
Blackstone’s, supra note 31, § D7.1.
324. See Andrew Sidman, Note, The Outmoded Concept of Private
Prosecution, 25 Am. U. L. Rev. 754, 760 (1976).
325. See id. at 760-61.
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(“ CPS” ), the system of centrally controlled
public prosecution was extended to all criminal
Crown Prosecutors have no power to
offenses.326
direct
police
investigations
or
control
the
initial charging decision,327 but the CPS has power
to
continue,
modify
or
stop
all
criminal
CPS
proceedings in their preliminary stages.328
lawyers (solicitors) prosecute offences in the
magistrates’ court, and normally retain barristers
The
to conduct proceedings in Crown Court.329
latter are independent practitioners who might
appear in some cases for the prosecution and in
others for the defense.
Barristers are therefore
considered more objective and less identified with
the parties than solicitors, who are directly
employed by their clients.
This is especially
true of a prosecuting barrister:
the Bar’s Code
of Conduct states that he “ should not regard
himself as appearing for a party.
He should lay
before the Court fairly and impartially the whole
of the facts which comprise the case for the
prosecution and should assist the Court on all

326. See Francis Bennion, The New Prosecution Arrangements:
The Crown Prosecution Service, 1986 Crim. L. Rev. 3, 9-14.
The Service was created by the Prosecution of Offences Act,
1985, which became fully operational in 1986.
327. See Ashworth, supra note 31, at 178. Crown Prosecutors
are available to consult with police before charges are
brought. See Hatchard, supra note 31, at 198-99.
328. See Blackstone’s Criminal Practice, supra note 31, §§
D2.33, 2.38.
329. In English nomenclature, “ lawyer” generally refers to a
solicitor, and “ counsel” to a barrister.
Solicitors and
barristers receive different training, and are bound by
separate codes of professional conduct.
Solicitors are
represented
by
the
Law
Society;
barristers,
but
not
solicitors, belong to the Bar. Traditionally, only barristers
have a “ right of audience” in Crown Courts, but this is
changing in the direction of allowing solicitors to try cases
in Crown Court and to appear in higher courts. See Hatchard,
supra note 31, at 207-08; Harry Cohen, From the British
Newspapers and Legal Magazines— Changes in the British Legal
Profession?, 23 J. Legal Prof. 3, 9 (1999); Michael Zander,
Private Lawyers in Contemporary Society:
United Kingdom, 25
Case W. Res. J. Int’l. L. 207, 207-14 (1993); Francis Gibb,
Lord Chancellor Eyes Bar’s Last Preserve, Times (London), Dec.
12, 1997, at 6, available in 1997 WL 9249120; Julia HartleyBrewer, Call for End to Barristers’ Higher Courts Monopoly,
Evening Standard (London), June 25, 1998, at 18, available in
1998 WL 13923293.
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The Police; Records of Police Investigation
Although England has no national police force,
since
1918
the
central
government
has
had
English
oversight of the local police forces.331
police are organized into forty-three police
forces, each headed by a Chief Constable, except
the two London forces, which are headed by a
Each force is answerable to a
Commissioner.332
local, elected Police Authority, which pays fortynine percent of the police budget; the remaining
fifty-one
percent
is
paid
by
the
central
In matters not controlled by
government.333
national legislation, local police forces are free
to adopt their own policies.
However, the
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO),
consisting of all forty-three force chiefs, plays
an important role in promoting discussion and
adoption of uniform procedures among the different
forces.
For example, in cooperation with the
Crown Prosecution Service, ACPO has promulgated
national
guidelines
for
the
preparation
and
submission of police files.334 Also, an independent
national body exists to investigate complaints of
police abuses.335
Records of police investigation vary according to
the particular investigative procedure employed,

330. See Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales,
Standard 11.1. Standard 11.2 imposes on prosecuting counsel a
duty “ to ensure that all relevant evidence is either
presented by the prosecution or made available to the
defence.” Id. Standard 11.2.
331. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs has overall
responsibility for the police. See Hatchard, supra note 31, at
205-06.
332. See interviews with several staff at West Mercia
Constabulary Headquarters, Training and Development, in
Hindlip, Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999).
333. See id.
334. See Roger Ede & Eric Shepherd, Active Defence:
A
Lawyer’s Guide to Police and Defence Investigation and
Prosecution and Defence Disclosure in Criminal Cases 145
(1998) (citing Manual of Guidance for the Preparation,
Processing and Submission of Files (1st ed. 1992)).
335. This
body,
the
Police
Complaints
Authority,
was
established by PACE. See Belloni & Hodgson, supra note 31, at
75-81.
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the nature and seriousness of the crime,336 and the
location of the particular police force.337 Despite
such variations, as the result of legislation,
police practice codes, and custom, certain types
of records are commonly kept.
These include
police notebooks, crime reports, custody records,
statements of suspects and witnesses, records of
identification procedures, computer investigation
data (HOLMES) and policy books.
Police Notebooks
Uniformed police constables in England carry
pocket notebooks in which they normally338 must
record
their
daily
activities,
including
investigations of criminal activity and witness
statements.339
In order to deter after the fact
editing or “ loss” of exculpatory information, the
books are numbered and bound, and have numbered
A record is kept of each book’s number
pages.340
336. See
generally
Maguire
&
Norris,
supra
note
108
(presenting models and methods of management for investigation
of serious crimes).
337. Different police forces may use different forms to serve
a particular function.
For example, some police forces
require officers to fill out printed crime report forms, while
other forces rely on computer word processing to create
equivalent reports. See interview with Head of Major Crimes
Unit, West Mercia Police H.Q., in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26,
1999).
338. In some cases they might instead use incident record
books, see Ede & Shepherd, supra note 334, at 35, or special
offense books containing forms for traffic offenses, for
example. Special numbered logs, with numbered pages, are also
used in police surveillance work. See Rob R. Jerrard, The
Police Officer’s Notebook, 157 Just. of the Peace 8 (1993);
Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 80-83.
339. See Jerrard, supra note 338, at 6; see also Maguire &
Norris, supra note 108, at 36-37 (regular checks of police
notebook used as supervisory tool). PACE Code of Practice C,
paragraph 11.5(b), requires the record of any interview with
suspects to be written in the officer’s notebook or on forms
provided for that purpose. See Codes of Practice Under the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C, § 11.5(b)
(1999), reprinted in Blackstone’s Criminal Practice, app. 2
(Peter Murphy et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter PACE Codes of
Practice].
In practice, if the interviews are not tape
recorded, they are written on forms.
340. In 1993 the Runciman Commission recommended that all
forces should adopt this practice. See Runciman Comm’n Report,
supra note 47, at 22.
I do not know whether any American
police force employs this safeguard. In some, note taking is
apparently very informal. See, e.g., William B. Sanders,
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Crime Report Forms
As in the United States, English police are
commonly required to file police reports, reciting
essential data regarding each criminal incident
resulting in arrest and/or prosecution.342
Custody Records
As a means of avoiding abuses in police detention
and questioning of suspects, PACE introduced
strict
record-keeping
requirements,
to
be
administered by a specially-designated “ custody
The custody officer must be someone
officer.” 343
of supervisory rank who is not involved in the
This officer’s duties include,
investigation.344
Detective Work 42 (1977) (reporting criticism of one police
force in which “ each detective took his own notes on scraps
of paper” ); Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 30
(describing how, in the Atlanta Police Department, officers
are taught the strategic advantages and disadvantages of bound
versus loose-leaf notebooks).
341. See interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West
Mercia Police H.Q., in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999).
342. The crime report contains, inter alia, details of the
complaint, the complainant, the offense, description of the
suspect, and investigation conducted at the scene. See Ede &
Shepherd, supra note 334, at 23-25, 39-40.
In some forces
instead of completing a crime report form the officer will
directly enter the pertinent data on a portable computer data
terminal, or call in the information to the station, where it
will be transcribed. See interview with Head of Major Crimes
Unit, West Mercia Police H.Q., in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26,
1999).
343. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 78,
§§36-39 (Eng.); PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code C
§ 2.3.
For general discussion of the role of the custody
officer, see Zander, supra note 31, at 74-80, 92-96, 156-62.
344. See PACE, supra note 114, § 36(3), (5).
For criticism
of the custody officer’s purported “ independence,”
see
McConville et al., supra note 31, at 118-22. Cf. Brown, PACE
Ten Years On, supra note 31, at 2 (“ Custody officers show
considerable independence in the way they carry out their job
although practical constraints limit their examination of the
evidence against the suspect when considering whether to
authorise detention.” ); see also Coleman, et al., supra note
31, at 24, 30-31 (questioning the role and activities of
custody officers); Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 27
(noting that disagreement exists over whether intended effects
of Act have been achieved).
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inter alia, keeping a detailed, contemporaneously
written record of the suspect’s detention,345
including the grounds therefor, and all relevant
events during detention, such as the time and
place of all questioning, advice of rights, and
the presence of or contacts with a lawyer.346 The
custody record must also include a list of the
suspect’s possessions when taken into custody.347 A
copy of the custody record is available to the
suspect upon his release from custody.348
Statements of Suspects
Subject to certain exceptions, police interviews
with suspects and suspects’ statements, must be
tape recorded.349
If tape recording is not
feasible, a contemporaneous written record should
Transcripts or summaries are made of
be made.350
taped interviews.351

345. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 78, §
37(4) (Eng.).
346. See Zander, supra note 31, at 156-57.
347. See PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code C § 4.4
348. See Zander, supra note 31, at 157; PACE Codes of
Practice, supra note 339, Code C § 2.4.
349. PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code E § 3.
350. PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code E § 3.4.
For skeptical comments on the ability of police to take
accurate contemporaneous notes, see Ede & Shepherd, supra note
334, at 229-30.
351. In light of interest in the United States in reforms
requiring taping of police interrogation of suspects, see
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: Videotaping the Police, 17
Crim. Just. Ethics, Winter/Spring 1998, at 42 (symposium),
Americans will be interested in developments in England.
Studies report both evasion of the requirements by unrecorded
“ scenic route”
interviews before arrival at the police
station, and that “ the vast majority of tapes are never heard
by anyone, as defences [sic] request them in very few cases.”
Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 116.
On the impact of
PACE provisions requiring taping of police questioning, see
Tom Bucke & David Brown, In Police Custody: Police Powers and
Suspects’ Rights Under the Revised PACE Codes of Practice 3139 (Home Office Research Study No. 174, 1997); Mike
McConville, Videotaping Interrogations:
Police Behaviour On
and Off Camera, 1992 Crim. L. Rev. 532, 536, 540-42; Moston &
Stephenson, supra note 31, at 41-47; David Wolchover & Anthony
Heaton-Armstrong, Questioning and Identification:
Changes
under P.A.C.E. ‘95, 1995 Crim. L. Rev. 356, 359.
Regarding
the time-consuming task of transcribing and summarizing taped
suspect interviews, see Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at
32-33 & n.4.
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Witness Statements
Statements
of
witnesses,
including
police
officers, are commonly reduced to writing and
signed.352
Identification Procedures
PACE provides that identification procedures must
be supervised by an “ Identification Officer,” who
is a uniformed officer not lower than the rank of
inspector, who must not be involved in the
The Identification Officer’s
investigation.353
duties include administering lineups and other
identification procedures, and making a record of
the same on forms provided.354 Prior to the conduct
of identification procedures, the witness’ first
description of the perpetrator must be recorded,
and a copy given to the suspect or his lawyer
before further identification procedures take
place.355

352. See Ede & Shepherd, supra note 334, at 48-49; Alan
Mackie et al., Preparing the Prosecution Case, 1999 Crim. L.
Rev. 460, 462.
353. See PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code D §
2.2. See generally Zander, supra note 31, at 172-75. The rule
prohibiting an officer who is involved in the investigation
from taking part in any identification procedure predates PACE
by many years.
See Home Office Circular No. 9/1969,
Identification Parades, para. 3, reprinted in Lord Devlin,
Report on the Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases,
app. A, at 159 (London: HMSO, 1976).
354. See PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code D §§
2.2-2.4, 2.19-2.21.
Lineups are called “ identification
parades” in England. See id. Code D § 2.1-2.6.
355. PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code D § 2.0.
This requirement follows recommendations of the Runciman
Commission, see Runciman Comm’n Report, supra note 47, at 11,
but was not adopted into law until 1995. See Wolchover &
Heaton-Armstrong, supra note 351, at 367.
Code D also
requires “ the police to disclose to the defense any media
material relating to the appearance of a suspect before any
identification procedure is undertaken.” Id. at 368 (citing
provisions).
For background information on identification
safeguards in English law, see generally Anthony HeatonArmstrong & David Wolchover, Exorcising Dougherty’s Ghost, 141
New L.J. 137 (1991), and Glanville Williams, Evidence of
Identification:
The Devlin Report, 1976 Crim. L. Rev. 407.
PACE
identification
procedures
provide
an
interesting
comparison to those followed in Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th
Cir. 1991), discussed supra at notes 273-277 and accompanying
text.
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HOLMES

On occasion, the police investigate serious
offenses such as murder, rape and major robberies
by setting up an “ incident room,”
staffed by
detectives and uniformed officers brought together
This is done
from different police divisions.356
when no obvious suspect or strong leads exists;
police
therefore
require
extra
investigative
resources.
Such major inquiries are often
conducted with the aid of the computer-based Home
Office (Large) Major Enquiry System (HOLMES), a
“ computerized information storage and retrieval
system which allows for all information emanating
from the inquiry to be stored, indexed, cross
referenced and interrogated for investigative
Data is entered, processed and
significance.” 357
accessed according to standard procedures, and
only by specially trained personnel who operate
independently from senior officers managing the
investigation.358 Comprehensive records are kept of
all information received in the investigation,
actions taken and their results.
“ Every item
relevant to the inquiry will either be logged in
the system, as in the case of exhibits, or
actually contained within the system, as in the
case
of
statements
or
transcripts
of
interviews.” 359
Investigations in which the police use HOLMES
typically
involve
intense
publicity
and
corresponding pressure on the police to find the
criminal.
Such investigations are therefore
particularly prone to result in suppression and
fabrication of evidence.
However, compared to
other investigative records, data gathered using
HOLMES is especially reliable. “ [T]here is little
356. Incident rooms are established in cases that require
extra investigative resources because no obvious suspect or
strong leads exists. See interview with Head of Major Crimes
Unit, West Mercia Police H.Q., in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26,
1999). HOLMES investigations reportedly number fewer than one
in a thousand cases. See Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at
55.
357. Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 57.
358. Maguire and Norris describe the HOLMES system in detail.
See id. at 55-69; see also Ede & Shepherd, supra note 334, at
53-56 (detailing the HOLMES system).
359. Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 68.
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incentive
for
junior
officers
to
manipulate
witnesses or to fabricate evidence and, even if
they did so, there would be a high chance of it
For instance, “ if one
being discovered.” 360
witness claimed that a suspect had been present at
the
scene,
a
[computer
operation]
would
immediately indicate who else was present, and
checks
could
be
made
to
see
whether
this
Although
information could be corroborated.” 361
senior investigating officers, facing intense
pressures to produce a “ result,”
might be
motivated to conceal “ inconvenient” evidence or
fabricate
“ helpful”
evidence,
they
do
not
normally have direct access to the computer
Also, senior officers are sometimes
system.362
subject to other, independent monitoring of the
Finally, “ as all documentation
investigation.363
is held on a database, it would be difficult
technically to tamper with the system to delete
statements, or even parts of statements, and leave
no trace.” 364 In sum, therefore, HOLMES generates
“ [c]lear and comprehensive documentation of the
investigation.” 365
A complete copy of HOLMES data is available to
prosecutors,
and— subject
to
court-approved
exceptions in particular cases— might be disclosed
to the defense.366
Policy Books
In HOLMES major inquiries, a “ policy book” is
kept by a designated administrator who reports to
the Senior Investigating Officer in charge of the
360. Id. at 64.
361. Id. at 68.
362. See id. at 64-65, 67-68.
363. See id. at 65, 68.
364. Id. at 68.
365. Id. at 61.
366. See
infra
notes
189-90
and
accompanying
text.
Disclosure can conveniently take the form of downloading the
HOLMES files on to a floppy disk. See Ede & Shepherd, supra
note 334, at 301. A defense lawyer told me that, in a recent
murder case, the prosecutor had permitted him to go to the
police station and look through the entire computerized file
of unused material. The solicitor spent a week reading every
“ action log” entry.
In some cases, he stated, such items
have led to exonerations. See interview with defense solicitor
in Birmingham, U.K. (Apr. 13, 1999).
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This document, which is logged as a
inquiry.367
computer file, contains records “ of all the major
decisions taken in an inquiry: for instance, the
parameters of house to house inquiries, which
lines of investigation should be pursued and why,
and the decision to arrest and question a suspect.
The
Policy
Book,
therefore,
becomes
a
chronological record of the progress of the
investigation which is open to scrutiny . . . .” 368

367. See interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West
Mercia Police H.Q., in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999);
Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 58.
The Runciman
Commission recommended that policy books (also called “ policy
files” ) be kept in all major inquiries. See Runciman Comm’n
Report, supra note 47, at 19.
368. See Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 66. I do not
know whether American police employ any analog to the English
“ Policy Book.”
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APPENDIX B
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the
accused has been advised of the right to, and the
procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been
given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented
accused a waiver of important pretrial rights,
such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
[Proposed] (c-1)
make reasonable efforts to
ensure
that
investigators,
law
enforcement
personnel, employees or other persons assisting
or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal
case reveal to the prosecutor’s office all
material and information that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense or
sentence.
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all
evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information
known
to
the
prosecutor,
except
when
the
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by
a protective order of the tribunal;
(e)
exercise
reasonable
care
to
prevent
investigators,
law
enforcement
personnel,
employees
or
other
persons
assisting
or
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case
from making an extrajudicial statement that the
prosecutor would be prohibited from making under
Rule 3.6;
(f) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or
other criminal proceeding to present evidence
about a past or present client unless the
prosecutor reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected
from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
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(2) the evidence sought is essential to the
successful
completion
of
an
ongoing
investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to
obtain the information.
(g) except for statements that are necessary to
inform the public of the nature and extent of the
prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate
law enforcement purpose, refrain from making
extrajudicial comments that have a substantial
likelihood of heightening public condemnation of
the accused.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3D ED. 1993)
STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION
STANDARD 3-2.7

RELATIONS WITH POLICE

(a) The prosecutor should provide legal advice to
the police concerning police functions and duties
in criminal matters.
(b) The prosecutor should cooperate with police
in providing the services of the prosecutor’s
staff
to
aid
in
training
police
in
the
performance of their function in accordance with
law.
[Proposed]
(c)
A
prosecutor
should
become
familiar
with existing law enforcement recordkeeping
practices
in
the
prosecutor’s
jurisdiction.
[Proposed] (d) The prosecutor should encourage
and assist law enforcement agencies to adopt a
uniform police report that will contain all
information
necessary
for
a
successful
prosecution
and
for
compliance
with
the
prosecutor’s
duty
to
disclose
favorable
information to the defense.
STANDARD 3-3.11
PROSECUTOR

DISCLOSURE

OF

EVIDENCE

BY

THE

[Proposed]
(a-1)
A
prosecutor
should
make
reasonable efforts to ensure that all material
and information which tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or
which would tend to reduce the punishment of the
accused is provided by investigative personnel to
the prosecutor’s office.
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(a) A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to
make timely disclosure to the defense, at the
earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence
of all evidence or information which tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the
offense charged or which would tend to reduce the
punishment of the accused.
(b) A prosecutor should not fail to make a
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a
legally proper discovery request.
(c) A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid
pursuit of evidence because he or she believes it
will damage the prosecution’s case or aid the
accused.
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